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“If banks were to keep, in cash, all the money deposited with them, business would come
to a standstill and a crisis would ensue. If banks were to lend to those who apply for loans all the
money on deposit with them, a general panic and collapse would follow a short period of
overstimulation. Between these two extremes lies the middle course, the finding of which is the
problem, and its practice the art of banking.”
—Paul Warburg
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Abstract
The Limits of Financial Equity: The Federal Reserve, the Depression of 1921, and
the End of Wilsonian Progressivism is an examination of monetary policy and centralized
macroeconomic planning in the American economy during the inflationary spiral of the
1910s that culminated in the Depression of 1921. Put forward for consideration is the
successful populist campaign for agricultural credit equity by the burgeoning Federal
Reserve System; set against a backdrop of intentional inflation, world and domestic
citizens competed against as the price and supply chain distortions perpetuated by the
policing of American commerce by the Food Administration, A. Mitchell Palmer’s
Department of Justice, and the United States Railroad Administration. Through the
extensive use of state and federal financial statements, newspaper reports, and personal
papers of the vested parties, the road to the forgotten Depression of 1921 is laid bare and
with it the pitfalls of activist governance—from expert management of the economy
toward equitable ends to the pitfalls of inflationary finance to the scapegoat of corporate
greed—that would return in the crash of 1929 and distort our world view of economic and
social ills in every downturn to the present.
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Introduction
The Dust Bowl Diary chronicles the life and times of young Ann Marie Low and
her family as they eked out an existence on a stock farm in North Dakota during the Great
Depression. Low was sixteen when she penned her first entries in 1928. That year was
during the “good times.” President Calvin Coolidge had led a quiet administration that
presided over a roaring era when, at the height of his popularity, he announced his
retirement from public office. His equally popular Secretary of Commerce, Herbert
Hoover, stood poised to steamroll Democratic opposition in that year’s presidential
election. Consumption was up, stocks were up, wages were up, and it looked as if every
man, woman, and child had a stake in it. This picture of the Roaring Twenties that we have
come to take for granted was unique to urban America. Annie Low knew a different reality.
Life on rural farms was never more precious. Writing in April 1928, she recalled that, “in
1919, Uncle Ames mortgaged his property to buy another farming outfit. A second outfit
meant hiring a man to run machinery and buy more feed for the horses.
Low prices made it impossible to pay the mortgage. Last fall, the bank foreclosed.”1
Seventy-one percent of farms in North Dakota were mortgaged and Uncle Ames was
only one of countless to face ruin in the Depression of 1921.2 That year, wholesale prices
fell as low as fifty-six percent from their all-time highs in 1919.3 It was a correction more
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extreme than any other in American history—including the Great Depression. Falling
prices cratered wages and tanked inflated collateral values that countless farmers relied on
to finance the expansion of their outfits to meet higher internal prices and wartime
demands. A recent USDA report on historical farm exits reveals that between 1921 and
1924, there were over 8,000 farm bankruptcies annually—a rate that dwarfs the betterknown departures of the Dust Bowl.4A closer look into the American economy in the
Roaring Twenties show a system with millions of participants and billions of everyday
decisions in a marketplace that bifurcated between a silent epidemic of farm and small
bank busts masked by the opulence of industry that came to define that decade. One
hundred years hence, American agriculture never fully recovered; the Great Depression
and the subsequent government intervention of the New Deal in the mid-1930s failed to
reset the balance but is credited with the first foray into agricultural credit and crop
subsidies on which farm production relies. But such programs had long begun in earnest
through policies of financial equity championed by the progressive movement before the
turn of the century that were implemented to their fullest extent by the Wilson
administration. The victory of progressivism coincided with massive social changes but
with it massive dangers.
During Wilson’s tenure between 1913 and 1921, the United States was transformed
from a debtor nation to the world’s foremost creditor while a new majority of Americans,
including large numbers of women and African-Americans, flocked from the countryside
to the city to take positions in the burgeoning industrial and service sectors. The fortunes
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of these beleaguered peoples appeared to be on the rise as were those of rural America
more generally. Despite losing some of its vitality to the metropole, the agricultural
economy was at its largest in the 1910s. After decades of struggling against Eastern
financial capitalists, agrarian progressives that lived on the margins had secured
government-funded farm credit. Their adversaries in industry earned continual scrutiny
while labor won the eight-hour day and minimum wages as well as a wholesale license to
organize—albeit at the expense of efficiency that would endanger all facets of the
economy. The remnants of the gilded age faded to be replaced by a first-wave of
stakeholder capitalism that saw unparalleled progress before unparalleled destruction.
As transformative as this era was, the Depression of 1921 is largely forgotten in the
shadow of the later Great Depression. The road to 1921, the crash, and its aftermath—as
well as what it entails in rich economic and political lessons—are subject to spare
scholarship. The Depression is occasionally mentioned in passing as a period of
readjustment between war and peace or as a brief recession caused by agricultural
overproduction that quickly fell away. The little secondary scholarship available differ on
the causes of the downturn, but agree that 1921 was significant in scope and the world
economy made a quick recovery—one often ascribed without government intervention. In
The Forgotten Depression: 1921—The Crash That Solved Itself, James Grant delivers a
specific critique of the actions of the Wilson administration during this time but titularly
suggests such a recovery. Tom Woods, writing at the time of the unpopular federal bailouts
during the 2008 Great Recession, uses 1921 to justify noninterventionism by putting the
blame squarely on Wilson’s tax-and-spend policies for suffocating the economy, while
championing his successor, Warren Harding, with solving the crisis quickly by curtailing
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the federal state and allowing bad business to liquidate.5 Scott Nations in The History of
the United States in Five Crashes touches on 1921 as part of the Federal Reserves’
activities before the Great Depression. Nations opined that 1921 came because of inflation
driven by wartime finance during the Great War and credits Benjamin Strong, governor of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, with choking inflation by raising interest rates on
bills of credit. But there was a fine line between correction and catastrophe—with interest
rates on easy money pushed so high, it nearly throttled the economy. Nations states that
this close political call made the Federal Reserve learn the wrong lessons and as such,
furnished the consumer boom with yet more easy credit on the road to 1929. Milton
Friedman viewed 1921 as a monetary phenomenon caused and then solved by the Federal
Reserve, albeit too late to avoid the damage. A survey of primary sources relating to the
"business depression” show that scrutiny fell on the Federal Reserve for the crash.
Throughout 1921 and 1922, Federal Reserve governors Benjamin Strong and William PG
Harding, the two most prominent men in the new System, were held to account for the
Federal Reserve’s actions before Congress. The distinction between causing the crash and
sparking a painful recovery was lost when American jobs were lost, wages were cut, and
business went bust. Yet before 1921, an inflationary crisis was obvious. It came to be
excused as the end-result of debt spending to finance the war and the Federal Reserve, for
all its faults, ushered in credit conservatism that brought the crisis to an end.
However, a critical look at the farm economy shows a crisis born of but could not
be alleviated by institutional and ideological power. The Federal Reserve—through
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coercion by the Wilson administration and the Treasury department— created an inflation
characterized by exuberant domestic expansion in the short run in a bid to help American
farms access credit. In the long run, that expansion contributed materially to the labor
strikes, race riots, and the First Red Scare that characterized the last years of the Wilson
administration. Ultimately, the Federal Reserve shirked responsibility for the crisis and its
collateral damage but claimed its role in the recovery when Governor Benjamin Strong of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York stood against easy credit in the summer of 1920.
Strong is credited with raising market rates which curtailed the availability of money and
popped the inflationary bubble that finally fell at the same time he made his stand. This
work maintains that the infantile Federal Reserve, driven by ideological aims and political
funding mechanisms, created an inflation toward aims of financial equity that inevitably
led to the opposite of intent. The Depression of 1921 was caused by these machinations,
and it was not alleviated by them. Benjamin Strong’s rate hikes were a brave step in the
right direction toward credit conservativism in the moment of crisis, but the inevitable
breakdown of labor and transportation made further inflation impossible. It was the
everyday American on the atomic level that decided against making consumption,
business, and labor decisions that ended the worst inflationary period since the Civil War.
Where the general will failed was in the recovery. Neither ordinary Americans nor the
Federal Reserve would repair the damage of the latter’s policy of gold sterilization. Missed
by commentors then and now, the issue of centralizing gold from local hands to the Federal
Reserve, from Western and Southern concerns to Eastern banks, created a silent epidemic
of atrophy as the Roaring Twenties carried on.

5

The Crusade of Monetary Equity and the Birth of the Federal Reserve
At the Democratic National Convention held in St. Louis, Missouri in the recordbreaking summer heat of 1916, President Woodrow Wilson reaffirmed his commitment to
policies that had served his administration well during his first term and, it was hoped,
would do so for a second. That first term did not go without its challenges. In the summer
of 1914, the Great War broke out in Europe and Wilson struck a cautious line of neutrality.
At the convention he maintained that the United States would stay out of the conflict. He
also reaffirmed his commitment to expanding his New Freedom program—his platform of
justice for the worker, fairness toward business, and war against the excesses of monopoly.
The New Freedom was Wilson’s political manifesto that dealt chiefly with protecting the
interests of industrial labor and democratic rule from monied elites. It was an evolution of
progressivism philosophy from its most academic mind and, in the context of agrarian
activism, key to understanding the concrete actions that defy economic reality.
On the progressive class struggle, Wilson channeled pure Jacksonian democracy by
assuming the problems of government as its inflexibility to understand the common man
and the laws of the nation had grown to favor the collective of business over the
individual.6 On the other hand, business also couldn’t act individualistically in the case of
monopoly. Rather than seeking their fortune abroad, American manufacturers, so he
claimed, played it safe by asking for favors from Washington. For Wilson, “anything that
depresses, anything that makes the organization greater than the man, anything that blocks,
discourages, dismays the humble man is against the principles of progress.”7 Wilson

6

Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call of the Emancipation of the Generous Energies of a People, (New
York: Doubleday, Page, & Co, 1913), 34.
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seldom mentioned agriculture specifically, but by 1916 all knew where he stood when he
said of his interest in the farmer, “not because we are more interested in the farmer than in
the mine worker and the men in the factories, but because, not only this nation, but so far as
we can contribute to it, the nations of the world, must be fed and the foundations of
physical life of every nation is found upon the farm.”8
Wilson’s remarks reflect how the nation’s farming life had changed in four short
years, expanding to fill the needs of a world at war. For his part, Wilson had not been idle
in enabling the farmer to do his job. The passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913
created a new banking system that allowed farmers to get credit in the tumultuous times
between harvests, allowing for farms to comfortably expand operations while affording the
needed equipment, elevators, and train car space for a seamless flow of goods to an everexpanding market. Productivity was up and farm wages had risen a modest ten percent
after years of stagnation since 1914. 9Before the election season was through, Wilson
would sign the Farm Loan Act into law. The act authorizing direct taxpayer-subsidized
mortgage loans and allowed for the chartering of marketing and financial co-opts—
forerunners of today’s credit unions—to ensure farmers never went without. It was a
meteoric rise of a trade that had silently expanded alongside the industrial monopolies that
dominated the Gilded Age. By the election of 1912, the issue of farm credit had infected
both Democratic and Republican parties. Some 12.7 million men and women made their
living on farms, compared to only 3.3 million, thirty years previous. The number of farms

Woodrow Wilson, “A Campaign Address to Farmers at Shadow Lawn, Oct. 21, 1916,” The Papers of
Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 39 August 7-November 19, 1916, eds. Arthur S. Link, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982), 503,551.
9
Department of Agriculture, 1924, 1116.
8
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had correspondingly increased in those years, as had the demand for American foodstuffs
that had taken on global importance. Before the outbreak of the First World War, the
United States exported $323 million in agricultural products more than what she took in,
amounting to over forty percent of all exports. 10As a debtor nation, the United States
depended on those exports to balance its liabilities. But despite all the outward signs of
success, American farmers in the decades leading up to the Great War faced two problems:
declining farm incomes and declining land opportunities—both of which drove a
nationwide campaign for centralized farm credit.
The decline in farm incomes was a measure of success. Food was now so plentiful; it
was now cheaper and—when complimented by the completed Intercontinental Railroad
system— more available. But declining prices in ordinary consumption were not reflected
in steady costs of ever-innovative capital investments. The national attitude toward the
yeoman farmer, not far removed from Jefferson’s ideal of that man as the building block of
the republic, was his independence. The farmer could take care of itself and judging by
increased food security at home, he must be. But the agricultural sector had to have more
than grit to grow product from the Earth. Farmers needed seed, equipment, storage, and
transport from season to season. Even new land could not be taken for granted. With the
Indian Wars at an end and the most desirable parts of the West settled, new prime farmland
was harder to buy and what remained was more costly to develop. Both factors squeezed
farm credit that was also reaching its limits. Farming operations continually expanded after
the American Civil War, outgrowing local banking houses that lacked the staying power of
the large East Coast banks connected to global markets. Eastern banks inevitably favored
10
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close industrial operations that usually precluded small agriculture operations.11 Even as
farm prices began to appreciate again after 1899, farmers remained cash poor and relied on
their investments for sustenance. 12From a politically active Eastern industrial and urbanite
perspective, the farmer was taking care of himself but that did little justice for the latter.
The Northern and Southern regional rift that dominated the political sphere before the Civil
War now included the West in the fight over the emerging gold standard. Gold had become
the international standard of trade and, given its rarity compared silver and paper, it kept
prices stable. But the gold standard did allow for the accumulation of exchange closest to
international markets in the Northeast relative—an inequity that did not go unnoticed. The
Free Silver movement gained prominence near to the silver mines of the Rocky Mountains.
Its proponents wanted the US government to purchase and monetize the silver it controlled
to inflate the currency--never mind its limited value internationally. Likewise, the
Greenback movement aimed to keep paper currency, or greenbacks, that had inflated the
currency supply during the Civil War, in circulation. In the backdrop of these movements
was the Granger movement that agitated for federalized sway to reduce railroad rates.
Farmers and industry were competing against one another for needed capital goods, both at
home and with foreign buyers who increasingly flocked to American wares for their own
operations. It was hoped that more money would mean more capital goods in the hands of
the farmer, never mind that it would not produce more machinery but simply inflate the
price for all comers.
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But neither bush wars on silver miners and railroad workers nor political lobbying
could sway the national course. The movements’ fate appeared sealed with the election of
the gold-bug backed presidential candidate, William McKinley, over the silver-tongued
orator William Jennings Bryan, in the election of 1896. It would be up to the gold-bugs to
defeat themselves when the Panic of 1907 gripped Wall Street and the Knickerbocker
Trust company went under, threatening to take other banks and global financial markets
with it. A recovery was staged thanks to the personal fortune and will of the greatest
financier of the age, JP Morgan.13It was the second time in fourteen years that Morgan had
used his personal wealth to avert financial panic. The system had withstood criticism from
credit-starved Western farmers and miners whose needs had been neglected at the expense
of industry for decades. The system stood ascendent over the control of the supply of
money: gold and the credit it underpinned. American financial markets, in modern
parlance, had become not only too big to fail, but too big to save. The US Treasury, whose
New York field office sat across the street from Morgan’s house, did not have enough cash
to save banks if they went under. The Panic of 1907 also served to revivify the farm credit
debate.
In the leadup to the election of 1912, Congress commissioned studies of European
models of farm credit while hashing out a remodeling of the financial system more
generally along bipartisan lines. During the election cycle when Wilson and his
challengers, incumbent Republican President William Howard Taft and former president
Theodore Roosevelt, favored a solution to the farm question. Wilson differentiated himself

George E. Putnam, “The Federal Farm Loan Act,” The American Economic Association, Vol. 6, No. 4,
(Dec. 1916), 771.
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by claiming that progressive Republicans were more interested in regulating monopoly,
rather than abolishing it. In an address at a farmer’s picnic in his native New Jersey he
stressed that “while you were feeding the world, Congress was feeding the trusts.”14
Ultimately, the split in the Republican party between Taft and Roosevelt secured Woodrow
Wilson's victory.
When he took office, Wilson did not find specific farm credit legislation on his desk
but he was thrust into a legislative battle on banking reform that culminated in his signing
of the Federal Reserve Act into law in December 1913. The act established the Federal
Reserve System—the first attempt at a central bank in eighty years. It was hoped that a
centralized banking system would serve as a bulwark against emergencies like in 1907.
Likewise, a central bank can furnish an elastic currency during different times of need in
any given year. The farm, for instance, needed more credit in anticipation of the summer
planting and the subsequent fall harvest and marketing season while less credit was needed
during the winter months as profits rolled in and old debts were being repaid. Farming was
the economy in microcosm, with highs and lows in any given time.15 John Maynard
Keynes, in his 1936 work The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, tasked
the state with evening out these curves through a combination of monetary stimulus and
retraction to guide investment.16 This would be the foundational belief of the Keynesian
and New Keynesian schools of economics and a stark departure from classical axioms that
espoused nonintervention. To this end, the Federal Reserve pioneered such a role in the

“An Address at a Farmers’ Picnic at Washington Park, New Jersey,” in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 25,
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16
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United States over twenty years before Keynes’ conclusion. Wilson christened the Federal
Reserve as a “democracy of credit” and a means to elevate the businessman and the humble
man above monopoly—by setting up a monopoly on the nation’s money.17 Given Wilson’s
veneer of Jacksonianism, his support for a central bank is questionable. Andrew Jackson,
concerned about the accumulation of wealth in the wrong hands, prosecuted his famed bank
wars in the 1830s that culminated in the dissolution of the Second Bank of the United
States—the Federal Reserve’s distant predecessor. For Wilson, a monopoly bound to the
progressive democratic order was needed and the creation of the Federal Reserve was
bounded by an implicit commitment in law to deliver justice to those perceived to be most
hurt by the market.
1.1. The Federal Reserve Act and Its Beneficiaries
On the surface, Jackson’s fear of the Bank of the United States could have been projected
onto the Federal Reserve. The legislation that created the Federal Reserve was written by
bankers and for bankers. Although the Federal Reserve Board of Governors that nominally
directed the new System were political appointees, they inevitably drew from the diverse
reaches of the nation’s banking class. The Board convened in Washington DC and after the
Great Depression, it would be politically and financially dominated from there. But in the
formative years of the Federal Reserve, the Board was dominated by Wall Street in the form of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York under Benjamin Strong—one of the ablest lieutenants
of the greatest industrial capitalist of the age, J. P. Morgan.

17
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From the mind of the farmer, the Federal Reserve looked like a cash grab; however,
the Act specifically spelled out financial equity toward agriculture despite the elite makeup
of its directors. The most immediate of these concerns is how the Act treated loans on
letters of credit. Ordinarily commercial, agricultural, and livestock paper were short-term
loans that had to mature at sixty days or less. The Federal Reserve Act extended
commercial paper to ninety days to benefit most enterprise, but agricultural and livestock
paper were favored with extensions out to six months.18 This allowed farms more time to
pay down their loans and allowed the Federal Reserve Board to fulfill its mission to furnish
an elastic currency more generally. The System and its new preference for the farms would
soon be put to the test when panic struck the market once again after the outbreak of the
Great War in July 1914.
The South harvested its largest cotton crop to date just as the Great War broke out, putting
a halt to international exports and shuttering the New York and New Orleans Cotton Exchanges.
Attempts to gin up domestic purchases by cooperative enterprises failed and prices fell to move
seventeen million bales of cotton that sat in American harbors nationwide.19 Throughout July,
additional credit dried up as European investors sold their securities and currency left circulation
with them, causing the head of the New York Stock Exchange, HG Nobles, to shut down the New
York Stock Exchange to stem the bleeding. In October, the Board of Governors led by WPG
Harding and Paul Warburg cobbled together $150 million in emergency funds to assist cotton
farmers and dealers as the German advance on Paris stalled.20 Europe had anticipated a short,
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sharp war but now both sides settled into unmoving trench warfare. Money flowed back into the
United States to grab at food and munitions already running dry across the Atlantic. Cotton
vanished from the docks, the Federal Reserve had survived its first test. This early intervention
delivered on Wilson’s promise and brought both Wall Street and Main Street together and
additional help appeared moot.
Governor Harding, however, seemed to have second thoughts recalling these early days of
the Federal Reserve. He came to believe that farmers nationwide in 1920 expected the same
treatment from the Federal Reserve as those cotton interests six years earlier.21 In 1914, the
Federal Reserve System was novel and untrusted. The Cotton Fund was its first test to build its
reputation and execute its duties in law, thereby attracting needed investments that the System no
longer needed in 1920 but had been without in earlier times. The members of the Federal Reserve
Board used their own banking network and Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency from the
Treasury to orchestrate the Fund without any field offices and few lendable assets.
The Federal Reserve Act gave strict protocols on mandatory funding of the new banking
system, but beyond that would be expected to lend in order to perform its functions. All
national banks were compelled to join as member banks and send fifteen percent of their
bank reserves to one of the twelve new Federal Reserve Banks spread across earmarked
districts nationwide. These reserves were still largely forthcoming during the cotton panic.
More consequential to the System’s functions and its actions was its reliance on the
Treasury Department’s deposits of cash and securities that the Federal Reserve was
authorized to deal in. The Federal Reserve could earn cash from outside banks through the
sale of securities and securities could be purchased to give banks needed cash. Treasury

21
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deposits, like national bank reserves, only began to arrive with the opening of the Federal
Reserve’s first field offices in November 1914. But the same lending practices was applied
to non-government securities like agriculture and commercial paper. To that end, the
Federal Reserve offered membership to state banks and began to drop its discount rate. At
the start of operations, the Federal Reserve Banks of New York and Boston lowered the
discount rate on all marketed paper the Federal Reserve dealt with from an average of sixand-a- half percent down to four percent. The ten other branches followed suit
independently through March 1915.22
The discount rate is the fee by which money is lent and, in the case of the Federal
Reserve, the rate by which individual reserve banks would lend overnight funds to
member banks. If member banks were in a pinch, they could forward securities as
collateral and get needed cash should it run low. This cash came from two destinations:
first, from the borrower’s own reserves—in greenbacks, certificates, or bullion, fifteen
percent of which was to be deposited at their nearby Federal Reserve branch as the price
for membership. Second, from newly created Federal Reserve notes. These notes were
first issued in 1915 but would come to form the currency backbone of American domestic
consumption. Today, Federal Reserve notes are considered cash. For all intents and
purposes, the Federal Reserve note is the US Dollar. In 1915, Federal Reserve notes were
a debt instrument to be bought, traded, and its face value redeemable in gold like any
other. The Federal Reserve note served as an immediate benefit to the System as a

22
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lendable instrument, an asset that retired the gamut of Greenbacks, Aldrich cash, and
certificates floating across the country, and a liability as it went into the hands of banks
and depositors who wished to redeem it.23 By decreasing the penalty at which notes were
loaned out, the Federal Reserve increased the supply of money while making it easy to
demand. The demand for this narrow segment of lending had downstream effects of
decreasing interest rates industrywide and investments beyond lendable dollars. When
interest rates fall, the price of fixed-rate assets such as government bonds rise as investors
flock to the investments with the higher return, while dumping unfavorable investments
onto the market. Conveniently, the Federal Reserve Act bequeathed the authority of the
System to deal in government securities. When investors abandoned old bonds, the
Federal Reserve could engage as an actor on the market—or in open market operations—
to retire those securities in exchange for cash or new securities from the Treasury. Thus,
the simple use of the discount rate could be used to control the amount of currency in
circulation.
Through the spring of 1915, the economy staged a recovery, wiping away a $500
million floating debt accumulated by the cotton farmers and other enterprises caught in the
lurch the previous summer.24 Exports to the belligerents accelerated and assets flowed into
Reserve vaults, no doubt encouraged by further lowering of interest rates on short-term
paper was lowered to a range 2-3.5% and the longest-term paper, ninety-day agricultural
paper, adjusted from six percent to 4.5-5%. 25 Agriculture loans were now cheaper to take
out, but the lowering of the discount rate also forced investment cash into uncharted
23
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territory. To make matters more complicated, lowering rates increased the amount of cash
and created inflation. At the end of the fiscal year of 1913, the country’s total money
supply stood at $3,720,070,000. By 1915, it had risen to $3,989,456,000. By the summer
of 1916, the money stock had reached nearly $6,713,000,000.26
Fig. 1.1 shows gold and silver bullion gently rising with paper, far outpaced by gold
and silver certificates after 1912 before a general deflation of the latter between summer
1914 and summer 1915.27 In that time, note issuance increased from $1.056 billion to
$1.198 billion, while bullion shrank from circulation. The proliferation of paper against a
relatively stagnant supply of bullion is proof of an intentional inflation by Federal Reserve
policy that was masked by the upswell in war demand in the short term. But the decline of
bullion in circulation, also by intentional policy, marked the beginning of an overleveraging
in the long term that would deepen the damage in 1921 and the beginning of the end of the
international gold standard.
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Fig 1.1.28 Currency in Circulation 1911-16

1.2 The Dismantling of the Gold Standard
From May 1915 until November 1919, the Federal Reserve’s discount rates
remained unchanged. Steady rates produce the image of the Federal Reserve as an inactive
participant, given there were no further adjustments to meet the demands and constraints of
the marketplace. Steady rates helped to democratize credit, the overarching goal of
Wilson’s intent for the Federal Reserve, by bringing rates between agriculture, commerce,
and industry closer together while emboldening them to make market predictions with
newfound confidence as rates remained stable. Combined with this new stability and the
recent intervention of the Federal Reserve in the market to help cotton interest contributed
to an atmosphere that invited malinvestment with an expectation that future help could be
solicited. As dedicated men of the industry, those on the Federal Reserve Board knew the
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fire they were making—the mitigation of risk and reward. A balancing act was essential.
As veteran financier and future vice-chair of the Federal Reserve Paul Warburg put it, “If
banks were to keep, in cash, all the money deposited with them, business would come to a
standstill and a crisis would ensue. If banks were to lend to those who apply for loans all
the money on deposit with them, a general panic and collapse would follow a short period
of overstimulation. Between these two extremes lies the middle course, the finding of
which is the problem, and its practice the art of banking.”29 The Federal Reserve and the
national banks within its fold had seen both ends of the spectrum in the course of a few
months. Credit liberalization, or stimulation, had created an inflation that had to be
managed. Without easy credit, it was difficult for business to meet the foreign demands that
would otherwise cannibalize domestic needs. On the other hand, easy credit is most
beneficial to those closest to it.
Government actors and the largest businesses with easy access enter the market,
buying before prices can adjust, resulting in shortages or higher prices of both consumer
goods and assets. It is infinitely better for those already in possession, but it quickly
becomes unlivable for those whose incomes had not adjusted to the new reality. Despite
opening credit for more Americans, the dangers of inflation weighed heavily on the Federal
Reserve. Their solution, with the cooperation of the Treasury Department, was to control
the nation‘s gold supply to prevent hard money from seeping into the economy, causing
more inflation. But this self-defeating feign of action is an inflection point where the
potential for economic harm changed from possible to probable. By continuing to expand

Benjamin Strong, “The New Banking System: An Address at Williams College, January 14, 1915,” Papers
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credit and denominate paper currencies while simultaneously encouraging citizens and
banks alike to take paper instead of gold, the Federal Reserve’s fight against inflation was
marked by more inflation. Worse, the gold supplies became further centralized in Federal
Reserve banks and Treasury vaults in the East, leaving hollowed interior banks vulnerable
when the economy soured in 1920. The gold sterilization scheme robbed domestic users of
their store of value, but it also imperiled international arrangements that relied on the
scarcity of the commodity and fixed rules of trade that gave the gold standard its
characteristic stability.
The world economy at the outbreak of the Great War nominally held to the socalled gold standard. Gold had been used for centuries as money, but it was not until the
end of the nineteenth century that it was universally understood as the default money of
choice, replacing silver, copper, and the litany of paper currencies and barter arrangements
that complicated international exchange. Gold was universally understood as the singular
measure of value due to its scarcity--a scarcity that guarded against rapid inflation and
deflation. As such, prices during the classic gold standard were reliably stable. It also
helped that governments throughout the world pegged their paper currencies to gold by
law. The United States dollar was fixed at one-twentieth an ounce, regardless of gold’s
actual value in nonmonetary uses. The British pound sterling, originally minted in sterling
silver, was fixed to one-quarter of an ounce.30 The switch to gold was political fire in the
United States in the latter quarter of that century. Gold was already the money of choice
for international trade based in the East Coast, but internally, gold and silver had been
minted in fixed ratios. The Coinage Act of 1873 demonetized silver to its coined face
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value and it immediately sparked an uproar amongst the same rural masses that labored for
lack of farm credit. They wanted an inflation to challenge the gold-bugs on the East Coast
and to stave off lost income. Bimetallism had effectively died as a campaign issue with
President McKinley‘s reelection to the presidency in 1900. But the gold standard that
emerged from these political feuds was only tenuous at best.
In practice, silver and paper currencies were the mode of exchange for day-to-day
exchanges but were redeemable for gold on demand. As such, the stability of any bank, its
ability to issue currency hinged on its reserves in specie. Likewise, gold reserves also
served as the basis for credit issuance. Benjamin Strong likened the system of credit to a
pyramid with gold at its base. Assuming a deposit of $80,000 in gold, one bank could lend
$60,000 in paper while keeping $20,000 in gold reserves. $15,000 in gold remaining could
then secure another $45,000 in paper, and so on. A bank’s gold reserves for a single loan
could also back a patchwork of loans greater than the total value of all the available gold.31
Gold was an asset in this sense but also a liability as enough had to be in reserve to meet
depositor demand. Too much gold in the country created more credit but too little to meet
demand meant banks would fold, loans would be called, and customers would not get their
money.

In Strong’s example, $80,000 in European gold imports ultimately support $240,000 in loans and $370,000
in deposits.
Strong, “Banking System,” 5-9.
31
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Fig. 1.2.32 Bullion Distribution 1911-16
Fig. 1.2 shows an expansion of bullion in circulation against total supply in the
summer of 1914 and a contraction of the former and an expansion in the latter in by the
following summer. The panic that reduced the total gold stock from the summer of 1914
bottomed out in January 1915 at $1.806 billion. By November, inflows of gold alone from
Europe, South Africa, and Australia had inflated the supply to $2.198 billion—an increase
of 21.7%.33 That sum totaled in November 1915 was described by Treasury Secretary
McAdoo as” the largest amount ever held by any country.”34 But what bullion had arrived
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from overseas now accumulated in the vaults of the Treasury Department and the Federal
Reserve Banks instead of going into circulation to be repackaged as new loans.
McAdoo, like the governors at the Federal Reserve Board, was concerned about
inflation and trusted that the gold that overflowed from his vaults would serve as a
bulwark against any future panics. But inflation concerns were not reflected on paper,
which the Treasury issued in abundance.35 In 1916, the United States finally overtook
Britain as the world’s leader in industrial output and her agricultural output had long held
supremacy. With more to buy, prices should trend downward while business activity
demanded higher wages. Instead, wages failed to keep up with skyrocketing debt
borrowing and consummately higher prices on the shelves. The conservation of gold failed
to check this and the need to flood the domestic market with bills show an inexperienced
administration caught between cataclysmic events and a public that needed cash quickly.
However, there may have been a greater aim. McAdoo was likely gearing the American
government for the possibility of war. In May 1915, the Kaisermarine torpedoed the RMS
Lusitania off the Irish coast with a loss of 1,200 lives, including one hundred twenty-eight
Americans. Wilson calmed public outrage by referring to any further attacks on American
citizens as an act of war. Not wishing to draw the United States into the war, Germany
responded by moderating its submarine warfare policy. In the event of war fears, having a
reserve of gold to make large domestic and international payments was a smart plan. But
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the public had greater cash needs than the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department
could provide. A large sum of this paper were gold and silver certificates—redeemable in
theory for bullion at the Treasury department on demand. But to prevent real money from
leaving, McAdoo and the Federal Reserve Board discouraged this as a matter of policy and
in short order commercial banks followed suit. The November 5, 1916 issue of the New
York Times chronicled proposals floated by National City Bank—now Citibank—who
wished to the abandon redemptions of these certificates and flock to Federal Reserve notes
in order to conserve their own reserves, a trend county and city banks would follow.36 Gold
became scarce in face-to-face transactions. That role had been taken up by increased
amounts of subsidiary silver, now-irredeemable certificates, and from 1915, in Federal
Reserve notes.37 Internationally, European gold flooded into the Northeast to be hoarded
while hard assets and foodstuffs flooded to Europe. Instead of witnessing an exchange of
gold and hard assets, American banks saw both draining out of the economy with greater
sums of paper chasing fewer real goods. This translated to higher prices to stave off
shortages of needed goods. When Congress finally declared war on Germany in April
1917, plunging the United States into the Great War, wholesale prices had risen as high as
seventy- percent from prewar levels.38
Wilsonian progressivism paved the way for the realization of the Federal Reserve
and to the letter of the law, establishing financial equity to underserved agricultural
communities in a bid to bring stability to the madness of markets. Aided by the Treasury
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Department headed by one of progressivism’s favorite sons in William Gibbs McAdoo, the
Federal Reserve succeeded in the former at the expense of the latter by creating inflation to
fight inflation and upending domestic and international stability by following Europe off
the gold standard in all but name. As the United States entered the Great War, her banking
system and all those who now relied on it for credit, stood at the brink of collapse. The
success of the farmer in the pre-war year built on the pillars of equity that endangered
others would be tested as the Wilson administration doubled down on its economic
program when war was declared.
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Wilsonian War Socialism. An Economy Under Scientific Management
When President Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany in
April 1917, he arguably initiated what Time publisher Henry Luce would later describe as
the “American century” in which the United States emerged as a preeminent world power.
While her military expanded and contracted quickly with the beginning and end of
hostilities, her economic muscle proved more permanent. The establishment of the United
States, for the first time, as a creditor nation with a massive industrial and agricultural base,
laid the groundwork for the American nation as a world arbitrator abroad and the successes
and excesses of the Roaring Twenties at home. The distinction that is left unsaid is whether
the American economy derived her strength from an expansion during the war or by virtue
of being one of the few spaces spared the death and destruction. But the war also took on
scapegoat status for the nation’s ills at the time and ever since. The Federal Reserve and
Treasury Department’s emphasis on war finance justified the inflationary unrest of the war
years—never mind the trend had been established in peace. Likewise, the war proved to be
hill in which Wilsonian progressivism climbed to die.
From 1917, Wilson’s popularity waned with the public as symptoms of a higher cost
of living became obvious. Likewise, public opposition to the war and increasingly visible
advocates for greater change—such as with the ongoing women’s suffragist movement—
were met with flagrant violations of civil liberties. These most famously include Wilson’s
signing of the Selective Service and Sedition Acts that saw the involuntary induction of
Americans into the armed services and the jailing of Wilson’s political opponents. Less
well studied was Wilson’s wartime central planning of the allocation and distribution of

resources by the Food, Fuel, and Railroad Administrations; these Washington bureaus
scrutinized consumption and enforced equity economics with armies of agents and the
threat of jail time. These activities resulted in nationwide shortages while making the
persistent inflation unlivable. The policies perpetuated by these institutions, like those of
the Federal Reserve, were progressive ideological outgrowths realized in peace and
legitimized in war that accelerated the conditions of collapse and a rapid bifurcation of the
economy between a perpetually beleaguered agricultural sector and the continued rise of
industry and consumerism that would characterize the coming decades. The war and the
rise of these new war institutions did, however, exposed a terrible paradox in which
scientific institutions run by experts in their fields cease objective measurements of success
and resorted to subjective emotion.
2.1. Infrastructure of Despotism
When modern economies enter turmoil, it begins with a pessimistic downward tendency
in all industries. Rather, it begins when the credit and productivity conditions between
industries become untenable. In 1917, American agriculture was ascendant, having benefitted
from a string of incremental legislative victories in Washington D.C., while their enemies in the
railroads and manufacturing sectors suffered from regulatory fatigue. Woodrow Wilson rode to
the presidency in 1912 on a revived monopoly-breaking and monetary reform agenda against
divided Republican opposition, winning forty-two percent of the popular vote. On election
night 1916, Wilson—once again—barely emerged intact with less than half the vote over his
challenger, Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes. But Wilson’s true obstacles lay with
the American public.
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Wilson’s preoccupation with the internal workings of the country had left him flatfooted
with the prospect of war on the horizon. Hughes argued for greater preparations, but Wilson
relied on his diplomatic efforts which, thus far, had kept the United States out of the conflict.
Wilson was more defenseless on his conduct at home. The last four years were marked by a
division of the American economy between an ascendent agricultural sector and a struggling
industrial base while the ordinary hand’s cost of living rose with an inflation that, by election
night, burned at eleven percent for the year.1
The separation between agriculture and industry began with the disparity in maturity
rates on their respective lines of credit within the new Federal Reserve System. But paper
for both industries were extended and their respective rates were stable, allowing for a
monetary policy that could be claimed as neutral. Beyond this, a trickle of legislation
tipped the scales. The Smith-Lever Act of 1914 benefitted land-grant universities by
allocating federal funds to cooperative programs with the Department of Agriculture
toward crop research and farming technology—knowledge that could be passed along to
the farmer by outreach groups like the then-newfangled 4-H club. The election year saw
Congress push directly on the farm credit issue with the passage of the Warehouse Act and
the Federal Farm Loan Act.2 The Warehouse Act allowed farmers to take Federal Reserve
loans on crops stored in public granaries and warehouses. The Federal Farm Loan Act
enabled farmers to borrow on as much as half the value of his land and a quarter of his
buildings backed by the taxpayer.3 That credit would be facilitated through the chartering
of twelve federal land banks backed by an ever-changing number of joint-stock banks and
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co-opts under the supervision of the newly created Federal Farm Loan Board, chaired by
Treasury Secretary McAdoo under the umbrella of the Department of Agriculture in
Washington DC. Wilson warned the public about the danger of government- sanctioned
privilege to the progress of the new man before his election in 1912, but by now agrarian
interests had prevailed under the guise of institutional neutrality at the Federal Reserve.
This also pervaded in a new Wilsonian institution: the federal income tax.
Before 1913, the federal state financed its expenditures through customs duties and
tariffs on imported goods. The Tariff Act of 1913 that followed the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment lowered tariffs wholesale while imposing possession of the earnings
of individual citizens, noncitizens, and corporations. The subsequent Revenue Acts of
1916, 1917, and 1918 raised the top marginal tax rate and lowered the bottom brackets to
encompass lower-income households. The original 1913 Act imposed a one percent tax on
all income and property but no additional taxes were levied on those concerns reporting less
than $20,000.4 The Revenue Act of 1918 raised the blanket rate on that same tax bracket to
4-12% and an additional surtax of 10% while the highest income earners could look
forward to a surtax of sixty-five percent.5 In addition, an estate tax, excess profits tax, and
taxes on sundry items from cigars to cars were imposed. From the Revenue Act of 1916,
the Treasury's stated tax receipts 433%—from approximately $725.89 million in 1916 to
$3.87 billion in 1918. 6
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These tax regimes had diverging effects on farm and business incomes that would
further the divide and misallocate resources into an unsustainable expansion. Businesses
operating under war profits taxes—taxation on profits beyond an approved amount during
wartime—would be taxed upwards of 80% for 1919 and would follow firms even if they
dissolved to operate as individual concerns. These taxation regimes might be lessened by
redirecting profits into invested capital, shorthand for continued expansion of the business,
which was not taxed.7 This included funneling paper profits into legitimate capital
expansion such as tool and building acquisitions to expanding accounts receivable-increasing credit transaction for product without immediate cash changing hands. This
created the potential for greater return but also greater leverage than the real growth of the
economy—which had only grown to 67% from prewar levels.8 Although both agricultural
and industrial interests were beholden to these new taxes and encouraged to mal-invest,
most farm operations were low-margin affairs with little excess cash to be accounted.
Larger qualifying agricultural operations such as farm loan associations and marketing coopts were exempt from taxation.9
The attack on industry went beyond the biased scales of finance and taxation. In
1914, the Federal Trade Commission was legislated into existence to become the executive
enforcement arm over the country’s existing anti-trust laws including the new Clayton
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Anti-Trust Act. The Clayton Act prohibited price discrimination against buyers of the
same product and prohibited corporations from owning stock in competing firms, aspects
that had been missed in monopoly law since the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.10 But the
inflation that dogged the American economy blurred the line between price discrimination
and needed markups to repay debts and earn a living. However, a businesses’ consumers
could now sue for triple the amount of damages found in any violation. As it were, thanks
to the lobbying of the iconic head of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers,
laborers and trade unions were exempt from the law’s provisions that would have
otherwise classified unions as labor monopolies. This empowered labor to push for higher
wages as business liabilities mounted.
Labor successes extended to the transportation sector, particularly against the
railroads whom had been long accustomed to agitation over long hours and low pay. By
1916, the ritual that had long avoided overt federal intervention came to critical mass.
Railway traffic had increased markedly since 1913. In the summer of 1914, Frank
Trumbull, executive chairman of the Chesapeake and Ohio railway stated that his lines had
seen over 6.5 million passengers boarded, a ten percent increase from the previous year
alone. The company’s freight tonnage increased by five percent in that same period. But by
the summer of 1916, that tonnage had increased a further thirty-one percent.11 In the West,
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the Union Pacific’s freight tonnage between 1913 and 1916 rose from 16.5 million to 21.6
million.12 By the summer of 1916, an increased workload and wages that continually
bought less made a nationwide strike imminent until Wilson urgently passed the Adamson
Act. Using Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce, the act gave rail workers
the nation‘s first eight-hour workday and authorized per diem pay on top of hourly
wages.13 These visible labor successes underscore the increasingly precarious nature of the
railroads themselves and their interaction with both labor and the state that would only
accelerate with the Clayton Act.
By 1916, the great railroads that crisscrossed the country after a half-century of
unscrupulous growth had long ceased construction and one-eight of all railroad lines were
under the supervision of federal state receivers, unable to manage their affairs on their
own.14 Despite holding the key to agricultural marketing and transportation and becoming
convenient scapegoats, the railroads had suffered a parallel fate on a larger scale. Despite
shouts for lower rates from farm interests, railroad expansion in the latter quarter of the
nineteenth century had been accompanied by declining rates. Like farm prices, rates rose
after the turn of century when the high fixed costs of building were supplanted by
increasingly problematic maintenance inputs.15
The early days of the Wilson administration saw the railroad industry fending
attacks from all sides. In the preceding years, state commissions were at liberty to set their
own internal state rates on shipping that differed state to state, though it was not always
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reflected by distances traveled. In a decision in favor of the government, Charles Hughes’
Supreme Court ruled against Houston East & West Railroad and the Texas Railroad
Commission. The latter stood accused of prescribing low freight rates to hubs in Dallas
from points in East Texas that were, in fact, closer to the border town of Shreveport,
Louisiana, in which commerce was discouraged with higher rates. The 1914 majority
decision ruled that intrastate rates, then only a quarter of rate traffic, could be regulated by
the federal government if it conflicted with interstate competition.16 This empowered the
ICC to intervene for blanket rates despite regional opposition, particularly from mountain
agrarians who pushed for lower preferential rates on agricultural and mining products.17
As the decision came down, the Panama Canal opened and waterborne traffic that had
long been confined within the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans could now transverse with ease.
The ICC responded to this by compelling railroad carriers to prescribe preferential pricing
toward product destined for ports while maintaining internal rates like what had been
alleged in Shreveport discrimination case. The railroads effectively began to subsidize
their own competition and losing margins even before the broader implications of the
Clayton Act were realized. Even before the United States entered the war, the railroad
industry could only maintain a dwindling operating capacity even as traffic levels
increased due to business demand. In October 1916, the National Association of Railroad
Commissioners, a syndicate of elected state railway authorities that served as a gobetween for the states and the ICC, reported a shortage of railway cars. With the onset of
winter, the Commission estimated a shortage of 108,000 cars. Coal mines in Colorado
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were forced to suspend operations while grain sat uncollected in the railway stations of
Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas, for lack of transport. The Commission knew quite well that
there was not a material shortage of cars. Both Union Pacific and Chesapeake and Ohio
continued to purchase thousands to add to their fleets year after year, although at
increasingly inflationary costs. The shortage was blamed on the failure of carriers to return
existing equipment on time.18 Demurrage, or late fees on the keeping of equipment past
allowable free time, was the usual solution. But in the atmosphere of the Shreveport Case
and the Clayton Act’s prosecution of price discrimination, no one in the state commissions
could agree on these rates even as cars seemed to disappear while traffic peaked to alltime highs. By the time the Commission’s suggested demurrage rules were approved by
the ICC in January 1916, the damage appeared to be done.19 Such was the state of the
railroads that there was question that the nation’s transportation infrastructure could
continue to function in private hands. Even as Wilson and the Democratic party
campaigned on keeping America out of Europe’s war, their Congress passed the Army
Appropriations Act of 1916. While the Act provided routine allocations for the armed
forces, it also provided for the President to nationalize the railroads should an emergency
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come to pass. It also provided for the creation of the Council of National Defense, a team
of industry experts and cabinet members that would coordinate material and labor in
coordination with the executive.
The management of the economy that reached its fever pitch during the Great War
had been building through popular support for decades as the United States transformed
from an agrarian to an industrial power; This change left a vital center of Americans
uncontented with the old ways that failed to alleviate ever magnified issues—what Robert
Wiebe called “a search for order.” Americans left their island communities to collect in
urban centers and the problems of habitation multiplied. Scientific inquiry became a
preoccupation in the years after the Civil War—especially in fields that defied science,
such as the understanding of economics and labor. Carroll D. Wright conducted the first
study of labor statistics in the 1870s. The collection of large amounts of information
mandated a bureaucracy to collect, analyze, then disseminate information and implement
solutions. This was typified by scientific management principles laid out by mechanical
engineer and business consultant Fredrick Winslow Taylor.
Taylor, who was best known for turning around Bethlehem Steel at the turn of the
century, emphasized a keen division of labor by task with an emphasis on timeliness.20
Wage by the hour, time per unit, and shifts measured in a never-ending twenty-four-hour
cycle was overseen by a dedicated managerial class. This subordination increased
production, lowered shelf costs, and motivated uniform labor performance where idleness
was punished. The move toward scientific management sharpened the division between
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labor and management and furthered the notion of the parasitic capitalist. But Taylorism
was symptomatic of large societal trends that sought answers to complex problems. For
Wright, it was the problem of unemployment during the Long Depression. For Taylorists,
it was a company’s effort to both increase profit margins now while lowering costs in times
of limited market availability and decades’ long deflation to ensure future sales. Taylorism
strongly emphasized scientific management, but it was an attitude that strongly pervaded
American society and those who sought to use it toward progress. Robert Wiebe in A
Search for Order called progressivism “the ambition of the new middle class to fulfill its
destiny through bureaucratic means.”21 In this context, the founding of the Federal Reserve
was the culmination of this movement and a test-run of bureaucratic management of the
economy toward targeted ends. The creation of the Council for National Defense signaled
how that management would be extended to encompass greater spheres of daily life with
war as the justification. Scientific management would ultimately bring the economy to its
knees, but many of its highest- level practitioners like Herbert Hoover and William Gibbs
McAdoo would free-wheel the political landscape in the next decade.
2.2. Market Panic and the Founding of the Food Administration
Even before Congress declared war on Germany, the fallout of the
Zimmerman telegram and the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare had convinced
the Europeans that the US would soon enter the war. As 1917 wore on, the prices on
agricultural goods—particularly wheat—shot skyward. In Minneapolis, the flour capital of
the world, the September wheat crop was selling as high as $2.42 a bushel despite more
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resilient production on the farm than in the previous year when that same bushel fetched
upwards of $0.93.22
The farmer was getting his due but the ordinary consumer was priced out of bare
necessities. Reports of speculative activity, particularly amongst merchants and brokers,
after the declaration of war had long mounted. Within weeks of the nation entering the
war, the Day Book recorded mass food destruction in Chicago amongst the merchants of
South Water Street, claiming that hundreds of residents “have seen cartloads of good
vegetables allowed to rot on a siding because if they were allowed to come onto the
market they would bring prices down and the merchants would lose."23 With these stories
and the ever-increasing bids going into print with every passing newspaper issue, rumors
of shortages gained credibility. These fears combined with the federal government’s
entrance into the food market to supply the war effort and keep her new war allies fed led
to the establishment of the Food Administration in August 1917 through the Lever Food
Act. Although the act bears the name of Democratic congressman Ashbury Lever, its
chief architect was Herbert Hoover.
A dapper, stiff-collared man of forty-three when he came to national fame, Herbert
Hoover’s rise was a typical up-by-the-bootstraps tale seemingly at odds with agriculture.
Born in Iowa in 1874, Hoover was orphaned at age ten before relocating to the Oregon
frontier, where he overcame a spotty educational and personal life to become one of the
first graduates of Stanford University. By 1914, Hoover’s career as a mining engineer in
the remote corners of the Sierra Nevadas, Australia, and China had made him a
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multimillionaire; but the unforgiving working conditions he witnessed in the mines and
refineries had made him into a progressive without a political outlet.
That opportunity came in summer 1914. Hoover had transitioned from field work to
consulting in London when war broke out in Europe. Hoover used his prominence and his own
personal fortune to establish the Committee of American Residents in London for the
Assistance of American Travelers. Through 1914, the organization helped some 40,000
Americans flee the Continent for home. As the German army marched through Belgium and
northern France, tales of violence and food seizures perpetuated against civilians floated in
London. On hearing what the English press were calling “the rape of Belgium,” the engineer
from Iowa sprung into action by establishing the Committee for the Relief of Belgium. He and
a close group of wealthy benefactors and volunteers raised over a million dollars in its first
week of operation. These donations were thrown at purchasing rapidly dwindling stocks of
wheat from shuttering world markets and funneled through neutral Holland into the hands of
Belgian and French civilians.24 Their German overlords, relieved of the responsibility to their
new subjects, did little to hinder this neutral party that continued to be the lifeline for millions
as the war dragged on. Hoover later wrote that his switch from private to public life was
unexpected and reluctant, but when he returned to Washington DC just as President Wilson
broke diplomatic relations with Germany in January 1917, he was a man on the hunt for an
office. He congratulated Wilson on the latter’s move to finally bring peace, but urged that it is
“desirable, as a matter of preparedness, to take early steps for the formation of a great national
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relief fund to meet the present crisis at home.”25 Hoover had a dark appraisal of the food
situation. In a secret telegram from London in April, shortly after Congress declared war on
Germany, Hoover concluded that there would be a worldwide food shortage by the next harvest
and America’s new allies in Europe had little more than one month’s supply of corn and wheat.
Germany’s resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare meant that neutral food shipments
were once again legitimate targets.26 This likely fed the fears of foreign purchasing agents
seeking to buy as much as possible to offset inevitable shipping losses and before the American
government’s own war demand cannibalized supply. These fears were confirmed by Sir
Richard Crawford, Britain’s former Commissioner of Customs and an advisor to the British
embassy in Washington DC. In a June 1917 letter to President Wilson, he appraised the
shipping situation. Since the beginning of the war, Britain lost 4.3 million tons of shipping—1.8
million tons in only the previous four months.27 To make matters worse, the February
Revolution had broken out in Russia and the world’s largest exporter of grain teetered on
collapse.
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In this atmosphere, the Food and Fuel Act was passed. The Act vested the executive
branch with a broad authority to “maintain the supply” of food, feed, and fuel. The
President was specifically charged with directing compensation to these industries and
fixing prices on both wheat and coal. 28 More generally, attempting to hoard or tamper with
supply was now a federal crime punishable by a fine and up to two years in prison. On
Hoover’s frantic urging, President Wilson declare a price of $2.20 per bushel and formally
establish Uncle Sam as the primary buyer by executive order. The rate was middling given
the fluctuations of a speculating market. Some have suggested that farmers protested that
the rate was too low, never mind that the guaranteed price was a minimum rather than a
maximum price—a price floor similar to a minimum wage. Hoover warned of prices
reaching over $3 a bushel but the guarantee did nothing to prevent this. The wheat man
could expect a bare minimum of $2.20 or higher, depending on his crop demand. By
executive order, he could not undersell. This would encourage the farmer to produce more
to take advantage of the price, thus ensuring a surplus that would weather the war. The
farmer stood to benefit from the Food Act, but it was all too easy to run afoul of its
provisions should demand fall. Hoarding food to await better prices was punishable.
In this atmosphere, the Food and Fuel Act was passed. The Act vested the executive
branch with a broad authority to “maintain the supply” of food, feed, and fuel. The
President was specifically charged with directing compensation to these industries and
fixing prices on both wheat and coal.29 More generally, attempting to hoard or tamper with
supply was now a federal crime punishable by a fine and up to two years in prison. On
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Hoover’s frantic urging, President Wilson declare a price of $2.20 per bushel and formally
establish Uncle Sam as the primary buyer by executive order. The rate was middling given
the fluctuations of a speculating market. Some have suggested that farmers protested that
the rate was too low, never mind that the guaranteed price was a minimum rather than a
maximum price—a price floor similar to a minimum wage.30 Hoover warned of prices
reaching over $3 a bushel but the guarantee did nothing to prevent this. The wheat man
could expect a bare minimum of $2.20 or higher, depending on his crop demand. By
executive order, he could not undersell. This would encourage the farmer to produce more
to take advantage of the price, thus ensuring a surplus that would weather the war. The
farmer stood to benefit from the Food Act, but it was all too easy to run afoul of its
provisions should demand fall. Hoarding food to await better prices was punishable.
The presidential order stabilized wheat, but to tend to the agricultural economy,
more minds were needed. Hoover was asked by President Wilson to head the Food
Administration that would enforce the Lever Act’s provisions. He accepted on the
condition that he and his advisors receive no pay; he also qualified his acceptance on the
condition that he could make final decisions. Neither Congress nor his appointed surrogates
within the Administration could overrule him. For Hoover’s part, he was answerable only
to the President.31 This made Hoover the final authority over what food was sown,
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harvested, transported, refined, and distributed, and at what price each workman in the
supply chain was entitled to earn. Hoover‘s Food Administration was the sole distributor of
new government licenses that authorized private businesses to sell, broker, and export food
stuffs, as well as the authority to turn violators over for prosecution. The Espionage Act,
passed along with the Trading with the Enemy Act, also gave Hoover unilateral authority to
approve or embargo unapproved food shipments nationwide. Likewise, Hoover had a vote
in the staff of an ever-increasing bureaucracy centering in Washington DC. He nominated
the Ohio law professor and railroad syndicate manager Harry A. Garfield to join the new
War Industries Board’s Price Fixing Committee. Garfield would ultimately chair the new
Fuel Administration that worked in lockstep with the Food Administration to enforce the
Lever Act’s provisions across all industries with controls on electricity, fuel oil, and coal.
One Senator remarking on Hoover’s meteoric rise as having a power “such as no Caesar
ever employed over a conquered province in the bloodiest days of Rome’s bloody
despotism.”32
2.3. Traffic at a Standstill and the Creation of the Railroad Administration
The market frenzy that saw commodities funneled to the highest bidder also played
havoc with railroad companies already on the edge of collapse. Inflexible rates subject to
ICC approval could not be adjusted to regulate traffic that now flooded the rails in the
spring of 1917. Further, rail companies were burdened by increasing wage expenses set in
place by the Clayton Act and inflationary pressures that ate at maintenance expenses. By
June 1917, Union Pacific noted a twelve-percent increase in operating revenue but a
seventeen percent increase in operating expenses over the previous year, partly through
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retirement of worn equipment and partly through the expansion of its car fleet even as the
latter became preciously few out West. 33Those cars could readily be found unmoving and
loaded the closer the rail lines got to the Atlantic. Professor Albro Martin, in Enterprise
Denied: The Origins of the Decline of the Railroads, recalled mass congestion of the rail
lines in the East in which “boxcars loaded with goods of low priority and with no early
prospect of ocean shipment blocked the piers while high-priority goods for which ships
were waiting in the harbor sat in the yard or were sidetracked miles from the coast.”34
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Fig. 2.1.35 Chesapeake and Ohio Railway: Fuel Costs to Tonnage
Fig. 2.1 shows the Chesapeake and Ohio’s long struggle with this congestion. Rail
fuel costs had increased marginally over the boon in tonnage in 1916, indicating mass
sluggishness with loaded freight and passenger cars. In December 1917, the company
reported that its yard and locomotive fuel costs had doubled over the previous year over a
marginal increase in tonnage. This correlates with a doubling of steam coal spot prices
from increased mining labor costs in the summer of 1916 and January 1917.36
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Given that the rail industry chiefly relied on contracted deliveries, these increased
fuel costs reflected perceived future conditions. Water usage gives a more accurate
indication of operations given the need for steam power and the resources insulation from
outside forces through water infrastructure rights often built by the firms themselves. Rail
water costs increased tepidly from 1915 onward, in line with increased traffic. But yard
locomotive water costs skyrocketed from a year-to-year increase of 6.4% from 1915 to
1916. In 1917, yard water use increased by 40%. 37Massive fuel costs hikes due to far-off
labor demand trickled down to increased passenger and freight costs leading to higher
paper profits. Those profits kept pace with trains that ran at full speed; only when the
wheels stopped did the real losses begin. The jobbers and dock workers needed to offload
freight cars were overextended and intermittently on strike. The port states of New York,
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts saw 1,558 strikes from all labor classes in 1917. That
was a year that saw a record 4,450 strikes nationwide. In the skilled trades, the
transportation industry was in increasing peril as anxiety amongst the other trades such as
construction, coal, and textiles, had fallen. In 1915, there were fifty-two transport strikes.
In 1916, 228. In 1917, it had risen to 343.38 Most of these disputes stemmed from demands
for better pay to offset inflation. Caught between inflationary wage demands on both ends
of the supply chain, the railroads teetered on the edge of collapse and with it access and
maintenance of the nation’s railways and a diverse array of infrastructure on their books
including grain elevators and water lines.
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Reacting to the situation with characteristic ruthlessness, President Wilson
nationalized the railroads on December 26, 1917 and established the Railroad
Administration to manage the logistical nightmare that now faced the nation. In an act of
comedy in any other context but war, President Wilson appointed the man perhaps most
responsible for the transportation calamity in the first place, Treasury Secretary William
Gibbs McAdoo as his new Director General of the Railroad Administration.
Like his father-in-law, McAdoo was a wiry southern Democrat whose youth had
been spent bearing witness to a Reconstruction that imparted in him a characteristically
Jacksonian view of common men. Like Jackson, McAdoo made his early career in
Tennessee law but quickly fell on hard times after squandering his funds in a failed bid to
electrify Knoxville’s railways. In 1892, McAdoo and his family moved to New York
City.39 After a few years of scrapping by, McAdoo found new success in bond sales and
corporate law working with the Hazleton and Wilkes-Barre railroads. This experience
enabled him to raise the capital to construct the first railway tunnels under the Hudson
River to link New Jersey with Manhattan Island. The “McAdoo tubes” were finished with
great fanfare in February 1908 and came to save millions of travelers and endless cargo
commuting time that would otherwise be done by ferry.40 This great leap of progress
catapulted McAdoo to national prominence and to the attention of New Jersey governor
Woodrow Wilson. McAdoo served as a key advisor to Wilson in the election of 1912. A
short twenty years after fleeing financial ruin in Knoxville, Tennessee, McAdoo was put in
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charge of the nation’s finances when Wilson tapped him as Secretary of the Treasury.
McAdoo was the key figure in financing the Federal Reserve’s inflationary policies.
All government securities, all gold and silver certificates, all greenbacks, and all new
Federal Reserve notes—even the offices of the Federal Reserve Board—originated in
McAdoo’s Treasury department, while the latter centralized real money in its own hands.
The inflation crisis now threatened the nation’s transportation system and McAdoo,
himself responsible for those events, was tasked with saving the situation. McAdoo
delegated responsibility for rail management to the Railroad War Board, a panel of five
railroad CEOs including Chesapeake’s Frank Turnbull, to manage the nation’s rails until
Congress passed the Federal Control Act in March 1918. The Act left corporate boards to
their day-to-day operations while the financial burden of running the nation’s rails fell on
McAdoo’s Treasury. The railroads would be compensated with a “standard return”
calculated through an average of net profits from a test period that began in 1914. The Act
authorized an across-the-board rate increase to compensate for expenses, but any excess
profits over the standard return became the property of the federal government.41 It also
legitimized the Railroad Administration, a select group of experts who had the final say in
all matters and were answerable only to President Wilson.
Profits would now come under government control, but so did the burden of financing
maintenance and pacifying labor agitation through a rail network that now spanned
300,000 miles nationwide—problems that progressive idealogues had, until now,
encouraged. In mid- 1918, McAdoo raised freight and passenger rates to offset the burden
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with discriminatory pricing to discourage commerce he deemed wasteful. Long-haul
shipping was prioritized over town-to- town transport and traffic was dampened while
yielding theoretical increases in revenues. But this was not enough to soften the
depreciation of equipment and the funding of betterments to keep the system running at
capacity. McAdoo, in his capacity as Secretary of the Treasury, had two options: taxation
or inflation.
2.4. The Liberty Loan and the Nationalization of Savings
The spring panic that struck American markets in 1917 that led to the
nationalization of the nation’s food, fuel, and transportation systems was not for the lack of
those goods and services but the perceived inability to buy them. The disquiet was a
monetary issue and it was silenced by monetary nationalization. Treasury Secretary
McAdoo and the governors of the Federal Reserve Board’s incoherent campaign to stamp
out inflation by creating credit inflation had been made untenable by the price spiral that hit
markets in spring 1917. President Wilson personally appealed to a world audience that was
desperate to listen. He provided carefully worded assurances that all comers would be
served and facilitated this image by approving a Congressional appropriation of $10 billion
in credit to the Entente that would be borne at the expense of the US government.
It was an amount that was nearly double the currency then in circulation in the
American economy. It was hoped that any inflation this would cause would be amortized
through government securities available to the public that would be repaid over time. To
ensure the success of this financing effort, he charged the Federal Reserve to discourage
bullion exports abroad while declaring an embargo on specie imports. President Wilson
deferred control over international money to the Federal Reserve, who would approve or
48

disapprove shipments via a paper application before forwarding it to the Treasury for final
approval. In a practical sense, Wilson was only acknowledging the reality of his son-inlaw's gold hoarding scheme, but this move had massive public implications. It was the final
break from the American banking system’s attachment to hard money. Although gold and
silver continued to be used in commerce, and token amounts were allowed into the
economy by the Treasury in 1917 and 1918, the gold standard had become an act of faith.
Bullion was not freely dispersed on demand and the free exchange of bullion, first through
hoarding and now through embargo, had been undone. The end of the gold standard had all
but been assured during the 1916 campaign season when the Federal Reserve Act was
amended to allow Federal Reserve notes, which had previously been backed in gold, to be
backed by government securities instead. 42 This continued the upward march of the cost
of labor, living, and the debt to afford it—this time through currency backed government
securities.
The mass-monetization of government debt was through by Wilson to be an
indirect means of giving Europe and the American government needed transaction power
without directly resulting in an excess of currency in circulation. Government credit, in a
sense, would delay an inflation by securitizing repayment over longer periods of time. It
appeared to be the only sustainable option. Paul Warburg warned of mass inflation if the
government proceeded to create new currency and enter the market against its own
citizens, while Benjamin Strong cautioned that getting the needed cash via taxation was
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also counterproductive. Tax policy had reached its most draconian in the Revenue Act of
1917 and it would be followed up by the harsher Revenue Act of 1918, which would
remain the de facto code for the next three years. Although the Treasury collected ever
greater receipts, the number of taxable high-income earners dropped in 1917. The wealthy
continued their capital investments, rather than draw a paycheck themselves while
ordinary workers continued to struggle with inflationary woes. Seeing the obvious,
Treasury Secretary McAdoo thought taxation and inflation would be counterproductive.
Instead, they opted to talk Americans out of their money by marketing—the Liberty and
Victory Loans. The New York Times propagated the benefits of war bonds by laying out
the differences between taxes and loans. Taxes took long periods to collect, a loan could
be made quickly. Further, unlike taxes, “when a loan is floated the citizen is appealed to
for subscriptions and he may invest or refrain from investing his money in government
bonds as he wishes.” For that matter, taxes were not refundable with interest.43
Such assertions were technically true, but effectively false as the debts
accumulated would need to be repaid with interest through taxes or additional inflation in
the future while already-cash strapped Americans struggled in the present. The
propaganda campaign for the Liberty Loan was immense. The Federal Reserve’s Liberty
Loan committees organized bond drives nationwide with famous names such as Douglas
Fairbanks and Charlie Chaplin taking to the soapbox to sell subscriptions. The four issues
of Liberty Loans of 1917 and 1918 and the Victory Loan of 1919 were a wild success—
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raking in over $31.06 billion and turning tens of millions of Americans into investors for
the first time.44
The Liberty Loan has been celebrated as a hallmark in investment history. The
everyday occurrence of investing in stocks, bonds, and other assets to protect savings and
hedge against the future began when millions of Americans traded for the very first time
and became true stakeholders of republican governance with the Liberty and Victory loans.
But that $31 billion sum raised to “make the world safe for democracy” pillaged savings
that had managed to survive inflation and presented the dangers of leverage in financial
institutions. Unknown to previous scholarship, some twenty percent of Liberty Loan
subscriptions were taken out by banks and the remainder was of questionable quality.45
Benjamin Strong, in his capacity as chairman of New York’s Liberty Loan committee,
warned his colleagues in a memo placing potential investors into a tier system, ranked from
most favorable to least. The “least desirable buyer” was one who would buy on installment
through her bank.46 Congress established a system of war finance below the $50 minimum
for a Liberty bond through a war-savings stamp that could be bought for $1 and an
aggregate of fifty stamps could be transferred into a bond. But it may have been more
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convenient to finance the minimum. This sort of investor, patriotic as they might be, was
likely to be leveraged and forced to economize to begin with. Enough of them might
default and put their banks into peril. But by that same token, the bank could borrow from
the Federal Reserve to meet subscription demands. As such, financed bonds and bonds held
outright by banks as investments, were themselves being financed by the Federal Reserve.
Despite all the claims of voluntarism and the chill of monetary conservatism the Liberty
loans promised, they were little more than additional inflation and a mass redistribution of
wealth from the American people to the administrative federal state by a Federal Reserve
that was essentially paying itself. This chicanery masked inflation in the short term but
created unbearable burdens for the future. The inflation rate slowed in 1917 and 1918, but
the bubble had not been dealt with. Worse, the government interest-bearing debt had stood
just over $1 billion in April 1917 ballooned to over $26.6 billion in August 1919 as the
Victory Loan was solidified, the repayment of which could only be made by inflation or
taxation. 47
The Food and Fuel Administrations leveraged previous legislation to control the
production, storage, and distribution of necessary commodities—and thus their pricing and
availability to the consumer. The Railroad Administration followed by assuming
responsibility of the infrastructure that made transportation and storage possible. Finally, in
one of the nation’s most celebrated moments—the funding of the Liberty Loan—the
Federal Reserve formally entered open market operations to nationalize the country’s
savings. The American people, already stretched by the Federal Reserve’s inflationary
equity policy, now had to contend with the nationalization of their own government bidding
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at their expense and, finally, expropriating the remaining savings that managed to survive
the inflationary frenzy. The stage was set for an intense inflationary spiral where endless
capital chased nonexistent product.
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Money Without a Seller: The Inflationary Spiral of 1919-1920
The Armistice brought both relief and anxiety to Benjamin Strong. The Great War
ceased on November 11, 1918 and his eldest son, Benjamin Strong III, could count himself
lucky to have survived his time as a young officer serving in France.1 The war his father
helped to finance, on the other hand, had left the world on an economic precipice. Central
Europe and Russia collapsed into inflation, famine, and revolution—removing them from
the world economic system almost entirely. Those fortunate enough to be spared direct
involvement were little better off, having to unfreeze diplomatic and trade arteries that had
frozen for the last four years. The United States may have emerged as the world’s foremost
power in 1918, but it may have been only in comparison to severity elsewhere. American
enterprise, despite experiencing massive corporate profits, high wages, and record low
unemployment, was in danger due to the dramatic expansion. Benjamin Strong, governor
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, knew that the financial consequences of the
years of gold hoarding and credit expansion could no longer be put off now that the war
was over. It was the start of a relative conservatism that would follow him throughout the
remainder of his tenure and seal his historical reputation as a defender of sound money—
vis a vis—the gold standard. Certainly, Strong’s steadfast belief in the market calm of gold
reflected to his time as a younger man assisting the great champion of calm, JP Morgan,
through the Panic of 1907. But there is little evidence of this conservatism in the decade
long interlude that marked Strong’s ascendance—a rise that would be tested when he broke
with the Treasury that he had long enabled.

Benjamin Strong, “From Benjamin Strong to President Woodrow Wilson, March 30, 1919,” Papers of Benjamin
Strong Jr., Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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Despite never obtaining a seat on the Federal Reserve Board, Strong wielded
unique power by virtue of his experience within and proximity to New York City’s
financial district. His branch was home to more capital than all other Reserve districts
combined. From the start Benjamin Strong supported Treasury Secretary McAdoo's gold
centralization plan for both political and practical reasons. Trade in money and what it
could buy had political power of its own. Given his branch’s proximity to the Treasury
department and Wall Street, Strong was perfectly situated to make a name for himself and
ensure that the Federal Reserve System, one designed by the banker class, stayed in
capable hands in New York—in effect allowing Strong an invisible hand on both the
market and the Board of Governors. But more practically, Strong through centralization
would allow gold to be rushed to wherever it was needed to meet flexing regional
demands.2 For Strong, the war had justified his position. Imports and exports of gold had to
hazard U-boat infested waters and insurance companies had to risk high payouts.
Internally, insurance and timeliness were also in question. The railroads necessary for
speedy transport were increasingly bogged down by strikes, traffic jams, and car shortages
that had begun in previous years. To these ends, gold was collected in New York and inside
the Treasury vaults in Washington, and differentials noted on the accounts of member
banks through a Gold Redemption Fund without the physical transaction of gold. But
inevitably, transfers did occur in the favor of New York at the expense of Southern and
Western banks whose reserves were increasingly unavailable for their depositors. By the
time of the Armistice, Strong proposed before the Board that international payments could
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be made the same way.3 Throughout the war years, Strong expanded his bank’s gold
portfolio and was the main recipient and distributor of all paper. In 1917, the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York spearheaded the System’s plunge into the acceptance market.
No longer would the Federal Reserve deal in domestic securities to smooth out the business
cycle, it would carry credit contracts to the far corners of the world.4
In his position as governor, Strong was also the chairman of New York’s Liberty
Loan Committee that siphoned off the lion’s share of the cash raised from the Liberty and
Victory bond drives that succeeded in financing the prosecution of the war. But the
successes of his professional life were foiled by immense tragedy at home that would
ultimately prove consequential to the world order he framed. The stresses of Strong’s
presidency at the Banker’s Trust on Wall Street had proven taxing for his family. In 1905,
his first wife Margaret committed suicide. In 1916, Strong contracted tuberculosis. It was
an ailment that would claim his life, but the disease had driven his second wife, Katherine,
to abandon him and take their children with her to start a new life in California. 5Strong
could do little but head for dry mountain air—then the only known means of postponing
the disease. Telegrams from picturesque Estes Park, Colorado and Hot Springs, Arizona
show a man in a state of fluctuating health, wasting away one day, bulking up the next,
and summoning just enough strength to return East to occasionally revisit a war economy
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he set in motion.6 Now the war was over and when it became clear that the US government
fully intended to raise yet another loan in the spring of 1919 without unanimous Board
approval, Strong was forced to confront the fact his policies of inflation control had failed
and a codependence with the Treasury Department had enabled it. Now the Victory Loan,
as it became called, threatened to deepen the problems of readjustment by increasing the
debt burden and depriving American citizens of their funds when it was now abundantly
clear that efforts to stop inflation had failed. Through 1919, inflating out of trouble became
counterproductive as the strain on higher costs of living invited violence and apathy.
3.1. Patriotism at an End: The Failed Marketing of the Victory Loan
The cracks began to show with the marketing of the Liberty Loan in February 1919
as industries began to slow production and war contracts wound down. The government
shifted from prosecuting a war to prosecuting a peace that looked all too uncertain. The
costs of transitioning from war to peace, to shore up Europe, and to get American
servicemen home and back to work, were problems for which the Victory Loan was meant
to solve. But for the first time since the First Liberty Loan, the public was less than
enthusiastic and less willing to give up their increasingly precious cash. Despite a generous
4.25% interest rate, the assurances of redeemability in gold, and a relentless public
campaign that reached ever-more isolated tracts of the country, contributions were wanting
as the dulled pain of economic life returned.

“Strong to William McAdoo,” Nov. 25,1918, Papers.
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The final report of the National Women’s Liberty Loan Committee, an organization
that accounted for a quarter of all bond subscriptions, shows a nation divided in equal
measures of resolve and angst. Loudon County, Tennessee echoed its wartime zeal and
readily oversubscribed to the loan; one resident claimed all they needed in exchange were
“two German helmets as trophies; the war is over.” Perkins County, South Dakota—a
territory without paved roads and highways in 1919—hosted men and women that drove
seventy miles to cheer parading tanks and deliver their subscriptions. But sometimes cash
was not forthcoming. The committee scarcely mentions the use of peanuts as currency in
Virginia.7 The picture was darker elsewhere. One fundraiser plying copper mining towns of
Arizona stated companies “took practically no share of this loan. Many of the mines were
closed down and all operations had greatly reduced prices. In previous campaigns, these
corporations were generous subscribers and those mining employees bought to a man.”8
Such a statement echoed the painful transition from inflation and war to normalcy in real
time. Wartime contracts that had propped up such industries had finally contracted and the
prices previously fetched could no longer be sustained. From January to March 1919,
consumer prices slumped for the first time in four years as factories and mines began to lay
off workers. But as quickly as the downturn began, it reversed. Employment remained
consistent and prices resumed their climb as the Victory Loan campaign was underway.
The fear of a painful adjustment to peace faded away as demand to rebuild a shattered
world overtook war demand. There was still business to be had, products to be exchanged,
and customers at home and abroad eager to break from a lifestyle of rationing. But that
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transaction had long been done at the expense of both the worker and the businessman. The
worker’s wages grew but no further than the liabilities of the businessman as both became
priced out of the market. The Victory Loan netted a total of $4.4 billion in subscriptions—
a modest sum by prewar standards, but nothing approaching the $6.6 billion raised during
last Liberty Loan the previous fall.9
While raising additional funds may have been a wise backup plan to fund
unexpected costs of the transition, the apathetic response was both a statement of futility
and a measure of how much damage the war had done to American spending power. The
consumer was tightening his belt still further, saving his money—or perhaps in language
Strong could understand-- hoarding his cash.10 It had long been a slur on saving Americans
during the inflationary hike, though the Treasury and the Federal Reserve were themselves
the true hoarders. Benjamin Strong had done what he could to get cash for the war effort,
but he also tempered it by stressing the economization of credit during the war. In an April
1918 column in the North American Review, Strong called to fight inflationary expansion
by reducing luxury consumption, economize both credit and labor, and bring women into
the work force.11 The American consumer was a problem that needed to be solved and
Strong availed himself of the cash- hoarding idea while pointing to what the Federal
Reserve Board’s 1919 Annual Report called “unprecedented extravagance.”12
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Strong warned of this extravagance in a letter to Russel Leffingwell, the long-time assistant
Secretary of the Treasury, on his examination of the fall in prices in men’s clothing.
Immediately after the war, there were layoffs and price deflation in the woolen market. It
was a glimpse at an opportunity for cheap clothing, but one salesman in Strong’s district
who lamented at day laborers’ newfound fascination with silk shirts. For Strong, the
workmen’s’ unusual wages were the problem, never mind the practical comfort of silk and
the fact that cotton and woolen prices had risen so that what was once a luxury was now a
cheap good.13 These were both responses to inflation and now the Federal Reserve was
having a serious discussion on the issue for further action, even though they misdiagnosed
the symptoms.
To determine the credit needs for essential businesses, Congress chartered the War
Finance Corporation on April 5, 1918, but in the context of the war economy essential was
a fluid determination. The Corporation was tasked to use taxpayer dollars and marketable
bonds to inject banking capital to any wartime industry or affiliated bank that served those
industries. Eugene Meyer, a longtime friend of McAdoo and future chair of the Federal
Reserve, was selected as the first director of the Corporation. At his disposal was a
Treasury purse amounting to $500 million dollars and an authorization to issue loans and
bonds to double that amount to any entity vital to the war effort that could not otherwise
get credit.14The War Finance Corporation made few financial moves that year, but its
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creation was the latest in a series of executive and legislative dictates seemingly at odds
with the Federal Reserve. Strong and the Federal Reserve Board preached moral suasion to
stem the inflationary tide. Their Board‘s reports and public statements consistently urged
banks and businesses to limit their credit transactions rather than use their own authority to
force change. They had given themselves to hope; hoping that milquetoast borrowing
suggestions and talk of changing credit conditions would somehow stem speculative
borrowing brought about by those same policies. Before the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the
Federal Reserve relied on similar posturing to quash stock market speculation. That only
led to greater speculation when no action was taken. In 1919, the Federal Reserve’s
marketing of more debt while preaching debt conservation did nothing but embolden
speculation and drive legitimate consumers out of the market. While credit continued to
flow to businesses, returns began to slow as Americans grew increasingly cash-strapped.
Indeed, credit and cash could not hope to reduce goods prices nor ensure their arrival.
3.2. Dinner Awry: The Success and Excess of the Food Administration

If production was the sole object of the Food and Fuel Administration, the war years
were a boom for the great grain producers—those who farmed wheat and corn. On the
farm, the Food Administration had a subtle hand. The Department of Agriculture, whose
inflated budget had funded agribusiness research—long thought by President Wilson to be
key to the farmer’s future economic vitality—now cultivated a portfolio of experts who
scoured the countryside advising farms on such manners as soil nutrition and seeding
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techniques. Likewise, the tractor and literature on its use proliferated.15I t was no
coincidence that the emphasis on the tractor came about during the war years as young
men were pulled from the farms to fight and young women pulled into industrial jobs in
the city. For the farmer’s shrinking demographic, the tractor proved to be the answer
though harnessing this recent technology was not as self-explanatory as one would think in
the present. In 1918, the New York State Food Commission instructed tractor schools that
taught the proper use and maintenance of these machines in an era where the horse still
reigned.16 In terms of cash flow, the Administration was encountered mostly at the end of
its production chain. Once harvested and boxed, these nationalized food stuffs were
transported to nationalized grain elevators where Hoover’s purchasing agents were
waiting.
With every subsequent step in the supply chain from elevator to miller to broker to
consumer, the Food Administration’s touch was visibly harsh. Throughout 1918, Hoover
publicly pled for the public to cut their wheat consumption by half, a narrative pushed by
the organization’s propaganda that stressed that “food will win the war” and
recommended that Wheatless and Meatless days be observed to conserve food. The
Administration also published pamphlet-bound recipes to conserve flour and sugar and
stress the use of potato, oat, and barley flour and sweeteners such as maple syrup and
honey.17 Such presentations bely the unpleasant business of depriving Americans of their
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food. The Administration’s annual report in 1918 admitted to a program of flour
adulteration that would have been a violation of the Food Act had it been any other
organization. When adulteration failed to free up adequate supplies, the Administration
turned to seizures. That year, government agents seized over one million barrels of wheat
flour that was “voluntarily” turned in by patriotic citizens and small businesses to aid in
the war effort. Hoover’s Enforcement Division agents ensured compliance in the public
sphere by ensuring grocers, millers, hotels, and restaurants abided by price controls, food
grades, and rationing mandates. New York City’s Food Commission’s inspectors spied on
the public to ensure Meatless Mondays and Wheatless Wednesdays were indeed observed,
much to the annoyance to the city’s vibrant immigrant community. Italian housewives
angrily dumped oatmeal pasta substitutes while Bohemians along the East River moaned
at going without meat.18
Having to do without was a patriotic aggravation to workers and wives, but it was
a threatening financial concern for eateries that had to find new and creative ways to feed
their customers and stay supplied by the Commission. The milling and brokering
business—long thought to be dens of speculation— faced less of a supply and regulatory
barrier but traded it for a dictation of profits regardless of real costs. One article from the
Country Gentleman in January 1918 detailed the cost of wheat production: from seed to
elevator—$1.82 per bushel; Illinois millers were allowed 25 cents per barrel—or eight
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cents per bushel.19 In this anecdote, $1.90 of the $2.20 price guarantee was spent even
before it headed for the broker. In such a situation, the miller needed to take on more
product to turn a profit—accelerating depreciation and forcing workmen to demand higher
wages for the trouble. Food handlers, often without the benefit of unionized voices to
moderate government demands, had to fight for allocations and any misstep could mean
the revoking of allowances and ration cards and potential bankruptcy.
Taken together with the years long struggle to maintain the cost of living and remain
open, the watchful eye of the agents also bred an environment of retribution that set
neighbor against neighbor. Such a fate befell the brothers Rafe and Louis Mayer, heirs of a
German Jewish mercantile family that helped build Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Keen to show
themselves as patriotic Americans, the proprietors of the Mayer Hotel were among the first
in the city to adopt Wheatless Wednesdays. But in June 1918, they were raided by Food
Administration agents. The Times Picayune reported that over the past ninety-six days, the
Mayer Hotel had purchased 4,700 pounds of sugar—three times the amount allowed by the
Food Administration. Much of that was now gone, but the agents confiscated 1,900 pounds
of sugar remaining on site. The next day, the agents returned and arrested the Mayers for
food hoarding in violation of the Food Control Act.20 The brothers faced the prospect of
losing their food cards—the permits that enabled them to do business under the food
regime. They also faced the prospect of fines and a term in federal prison. In short, they
faced ruin. Rafe pled ignorance of the law before none less than the state governor and
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head of the Louisiana Food Administration John Parker. But given his previous
compliance, he had to have known. But as quickly as the Meyer brothers were in jail, by
August 1st, they were free. The cost was a $1000 donation and the forfeiture of the seized
sugar to charity.21How the brothers came under suspicion remain a mystery, but their
ultimate treatment was the preferred method. The Enforcement Division described
violators of the law as patriotic and ignorant of the law. As punishment, the agency
preferred to take refunds and so-called contributions in lieu of jail. Temporary suspensions
of licensing and supplies were less common; seventy-two violators were criminally
charged.22

Fig. 3.1.23 American Wheat 1913 to 1920
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Under Hoover’s administration, exports were sliced. Out of the 650.8 million
bushels worth of all wheat products brought to market in 1917, 132.6 million was bought
on the export market. In 1916, in the face of less production, the wheat industry was still
able to export 203.6 million bushels. With price guarantees and export markets left largely
out of the hands of private exporters, the American public should have enjoyed a surplus.
Despite the Administration’s monopoly, its scrutiny from seed to store, the nation was
cursed with shortages. That year, the country had to import 24.1 million bushels of wheat
from Canada—the first noticeable grain transfer since Europe went to war. In 1918, that
had grown to 28.1 million.24 Corn farmers, who enjoyed far more success in crop yields
and declining import competition, were themselves cropped in by the flagging fortunes of
hog farmers that relied on corn for cheap, nutritious feed for their pigs. Despite record level
of corn production, the number of hogs available for pork markets fell by ten million
animals.25
The end of the war saw the American economy in shambles Hoover’s Belgian
Relief Commission, who fed as many as ten million Belgians and French during wartime
continued operations into 1919. His efforts there and in the American Relief Corporation
were merged with the US Grain Corporation to deal in food relief in the shattered remnants
of the Hapsburg, Russian, and Ottoman empires from Czechoslovakia and Poland to
Armenia and Azerbaijan. These new states, long weakened by the war, now struggled for
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want of food, let alone recognition, with Bolshevik Russia at their borders. By Hoover’s
big-picture estimate in 1918, these “little Allies” constituted seventy-five million mouths to
feed, along with 125 million of
the “big allies” --Britain, France, and Italy.26 The Entente, for their part, could get food, but
dire starvation was much closer than the frontiers of Bolshevik Russia in the East.
Suffering from years of inflationary and nationalization mismanagement of their economy
under the administration of Prime Minister Karl Renner, the territories of the former
Austro-Hungarian empire existed in a state of famine.27 Germany hemorrhaged from the
same problems engineered by the military dictatorship that ran the country under Paul von
Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. Britain, France, and the rest of the Entente embarked on
similar economic engineering schemes undertaken by the Central Powers and the United
States but had the luxury of being an unblockaded captive market. Almost immediately
after the end of the war, both the Americans and the Entente knew that captive market no
longer existed. The fate of the world’s food circulation grew ever more precarious as
Europe, despite all measures of dependence on the United States, leverage their status as
viable markets that the United States herself was now dependent on.
The first signs of Europe’s soft power returning occurred when Hoover chaired a
conference of the Inter-Allied Blockade Council on Christmas Eve, 1918. The body, made
up of representatives of the Entente powers, oversaw trade policies between them, but now
the time had come for the embargos to fall and for the British navy to lift their years-long
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blockade of the German coast. Hoover’s European constituents agreed to lift the blockade
on Germany and neutral nations. Six days later after a frenzy of ordering on American
markets by neutral nations, the Council met again without Hoover and determined to
reinstate the blockade. The indebted Entente proceeded to order the distribution of
American foodstuffs without American input while withholding those desperately needed
goods from their former enemies. Hoover’s loud protests to President Wilson and the
British admiralty finally bore results and the blockade was lifted in June. The German
mainland had suffered privation and starvation in the latter part of the war and the
blockade, itself an act of war after the end of hostilities, may have resulted in additional
200,000 civilian deaths.28 Hoover’s fight with the Council mirrored Wilson’s fight with his
war allies at the Paris Peace Conference. Wilson arrived with his Fourteen Points that
advocated for, among other things, open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, selfdetermination, and the creation of a League of Nations to arbitrate future conflicts. To the
President’s surprise, his partners rejected him and opted for a harder peace that they could
not enforce.
Beyond the peace, Europe also held American credit and would use it against the
American productive class to win an economic war that had been written off as lost. This
was especially apparent in the farm economy—particularly in the vital global wheat
commodity. With worldwide food shortages and the sudden lifting of trade restrictions,
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wheat exports should have soared. Wheat production was set to match with farms
producing over 970 million bushels in 1919—a quantity not seen since the 1915 harvest.
Instead, the wheat crop of 1919 sat unattended in grain elevators and dock facilities as
exports fell from a peak of 287 million bushels in the last year of the war down to 220
million.29 The same mass production and wanting demand that befell wheat farmers that
year was mirrored by other food commodities such as some meat products, rice, corn, and
oats.
The fall in demand for agricultural goods could not have come at a worse time. Like his
compatriots in industry, farmers had to offset costs and compensate ever-increasing wages.
Without large scale unionization, workers and farmers minimized their compensation conflicts
and easy credit made it an easy pill to swallow. But by the end of the war, farms were plagued
with a lack of labor—rather than the cost of it. The removal of roughly two million rural men
from the farm to serve in the Armed Forces was a worry of the Food Administration. It became
the job of the US Employment Service, a new division of the Department of Labor, to seek out
idle labor. They solicited young women and “Boy’s Working Reserves”—a 250,000 strong
army of children under the age of sixteen—to fill the labor gap.30 The return of those men
from the war, often blamed for the downturn to come, was not an immediate flood of the
newly demobilized ready to take waiting jobs. And those who did so did not flock
wholesale back to the farm. In July 1919, the War Department announced the discharge of
three-million men, only 1.8 million of which had arrived home.31 They found high paying
29
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employment and more comfortable circumstances in the urban centers far from isolated
homesteads, contributing to a growing migration of rural workers to cities that had been
ongoing. The 1920 Census would be the first in which more American citizens lived in
cities and towns instead of the country, countless demobilized servicemen among them.
The demobilization created renewed competition for employment between servicemen and
those who filled the gap in the interim— women and minorities who flocked to Northern
factories. Despite the anecdotes of race riots in cities such as Chicago, Detroit, and
Washington DC that pitted new black arrivals against white servicemen, most industries
were able to absorb the influx into a tight labor market that still ran on the assumption that
Europe‘s industrial capacity, like its agricultural output, would be slow to return. Despite
the challenges of making room for American veterans and persistent strikes across all
industries, most sectors of the economy had work including those in the textile industries
that suffered with the termination of government demands.
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Table 3.1.32 Estimated Employment and Pay 1918-1921
Estimated Employment and Pay 1918-1921
1918

1919

1920

1921

Iron/Steel

181,126

156,918

180,797

102,787

Automotive

108,058

140,714

129,194

82,946

Wool

46,456

49,761

23,613

50,523

Cotton

56,376

57,017

59,336

60,355

Iron/Steel

11,302

10,222

13,880

4,362

Automotive

2,917

3,559

4,549

2,765

Wool

941

1,081

620

1,003

Cotton

905

1,026

1,386

1,133

Employees

Pay

Lost in the gender and racial dynamics of this post-war conflict is a fight to fit back
into a bifurcated economy—one for good paying industrial and service work in the
relative comfort of the city now trounced rural work that now prospered only with the
benefit of government subsidies. Manufacturing jobs and the burgeoning of the service
industry to feed, entertain, and maintain an ever-larger urban population enjoyed a tight
labor market, but farm concerns nationwide struggled to find workers despite no shortage
of funds. The Kansas State Board of Agriculture detailed both 1919 and 1920 as best-paid
times for farm workers in the state, harvesting the largest wheat crop to date, year after
year, but farmers were resorting to advertising free train fare to lure out-of-staters to work.
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Failing this, companies such as Ford and John Deere began to fill the gap and farmers
flocked to the tractor to replace field hands. The Ford Motor Company marketed its first,
the Fordson, in 1917. That year saw 254 units roll off the assembly line. By 1919, nearly
100,000 were produced.33
The mechanization of farm labor was a response to labor shortages but also
evidence of an expansion at any cost as farms became more reliant on forms of emergency
credit, particularly in mortgage loans through the Federal Land Banks. In 1918, the Federal
Land Banks closed 108.6 million in farm mortgage loans—a 216% increase from the
previous year. The system also doled out $141 million in special land bonds—short term
investments to be bought by banks and private citizens in exchange for cash. For 1919, the
operation closed $142 million in loans and issued $286 million in bonds to the public.34
Borrower disclosures indicate that two-thirds of those loans over this period were taken
with a fully-owned home or buildings as collateral. The farm economy had effectively
overleveraged themselves in response to production incentives of easy credit, legislative
carveouts, and finally, in price and production subsidies. The inevitable outcome, with or
without the war, was a vast glut of products marked at prices neither domestic nor foreign
buyers could stand. With state price controls serving as a baseline from which merchants
could not undersell, prices could only amplify with every painful move through supply
chain stations crippled by the same policy prescriptions.
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For some in the Wilson fold, like Harry Garfield, chairman of the disbanding Fuel
Administration that regulated the prices and distribution of coal, oil, and the public utilities
during the war, urged the end to price controls. Likewise, Walker Hines, vice-chair of the
Railroad Administration, gave President Wilson the same appraisal. Julius Barnes, head of
the US Grain Corporation, blamed the same price controls as inflexible in the face of
cheaper overseas competition. For Wilson, the ending of price controls on certain goods
would only invite uncontrolled price bidding. Unwilling to hold neither the farm nor his
own bureaucratic interests to account, Wilson blamed the vague center of the supply chain
between farm and table. He accused the middlemen of hoarding product and waiting higher
prices by restricting supply. Those millers, brokers, and grocers responsible for taking raw
goods and turning them into useable and distributable products—and those who had chafed
under the inflationary pressures from the farm and the magnifying glass of the
bureaucracy—became an even-easier mark with every dollar-increase. On inaugurating the
creation of the Food Administration, Wilson was confident that there would be “only in the
few cases where some small and selfish minority proves unwilling to put the nation's
interests above personal advantage.”35 By 1919, the profiteer had become the domestic
phantom of a Wilson administration now geared toward foreign peace. As Wilson’s time
became dominated by the Paris Peace Conference, domestic papers regaled audiences with
accusations and punishments against Bolshevik profiteers, both in business and in labor.
But price rises had less to do with greed than necessity. The liberal use of the printing press
in Washington DC created more money chasing fewer goods and prices had to adjust to
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prevent shortages. The entry of the government into the market further siphoned off
resources from the market. In such an environment, consumers were forced to buy more
now in anticipation of higher prices later. This created an increased run on goods that only
grew worse when price controls were implemented, resulting in acute shortages in some
regions with plenty in others. But there was a limit to inflationary consumption and
demand as that year both foreign and domestic consumers refused to buy despite an
environment nominally rich in cash.
The problem of the profiteer as the problem of inflation and of the farmer was one
that Wilson had to take head-on with only his executive privileges from the Food Control
Act available to forge his initiatives in real-time. In February 1919, the Food
Administration became the American Relief Organization and the US Grain Corporation,
their priorities shifting from domestic production to helping the European situation.
Meanwhile, the now-obsolete War Industries Board allowed its Price Fixing Committee to
die, leaving supply and demand to a market that Wilson may as well have chalked up to a
speculative heaven.36 But the Food Act still allowed for controls on a limited range of vital
commodities including wheat. These provisions were due to expire six months after the end
of hostilities, both Herbert Hoover and the congressional farm interests led by South
Carolina Senator Ashbury France Lever lobbied for its continuation. For his US Grain
Corporation, Hoover needed a large amount of grain to fight world shortages that, by his
own estimation, was to fall by a half-billion bushels in 1920. Fully aware of competing
surpluses from other countries and the need to keep farmers producing at home, Hoover
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called for government agents to buy at $3-4 a bushel at home and sell overseas at a loss.
Instead, the Wheat Guarantee Act that came at his insistence earmarked the 1919 crop at
$2.26. To stabilize wheat prices, Congress approved a $1 billion appropriation to subsidize
the farmers. 37 In an act of executive profiteering, President Wilson signed on to enrich
wheat farmers over all others. But even this bailout was not enough. The farm lobby
pushed for a new tariff to protect their products and punish domestic consumption of
foreign competing products. The Underwood Tariff that ushered in the income tax in 1913
also lowered tariff rates across the board. Tariff reduction was of little consequence during
the war. In 1916, the export to import ratio peaked at 2.29:1. But in 1919, it had fallen to
2.02:1. By the summer of 1920, exports fell further to 1.56:1.38 The passage of the Wheat
Guarantee Act and the renewed push for tariff legislation was a tactic admission that
agriculture could not compete for both foreign and domestic business. Even before the shoe
dropped, Julius Barnes warned President Wilson of this reality by pointing out the
untapped potential of Canada and Argentina, whose surplus wheat now competed with the
American exports, reaching Britain at prices as low as $2.28 at its destination, eight cents
higher than what the government paid for wheat sitting in American elevators.39 The
Argentines, were particularly worrisome, having minimized her trade during the war only
to explode onto the international market post war. Textile interests joined in the clammer
for a tariff when Argentine wool flooding American markets drove down the price at home
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as American woolen textile factories, facing the closing of government uniform contracts
and serious shortages of sheep from Western ranges, laid off workers who could ill-afford
a pay cut.40 Argentine wheat threatened to do the same to the American farmer on the
global market.
Argentina had no shortage of wheat. In 1918, her industrious farmers had produced
six-million bushels and exported half its crop.41 In 1919, production fell to 4.7 million
bushels, but exports increased further still to 3.3 million. Britain, as a conduit of trade into
the Continent, saw a steep decline in Argentine grain shipments through the war years only
to return with authority in 1919. Although much of the raw wheat was turned over to her
partners in Europe, Britain retained large stocks of wheat flour exported in quantity from
Buenos Aires, rising from 1,200 barrels in 1918 to 68,100 in 1919, nearly to the stock that
it had been before the war.42 With price controls forcing the sale of American wheat at
higher prices, American farmers could not compete with the Argentines on the global
market in which Europe, keenly aware of their situation opted to make every American
dollar count by spending it elsewhere. Likewise, American agriculture had grown so
distorted that farms were losing domestic consumption as well. The cash-strapped public
that had now become accustomed to war rationing sought other options. This is particularly
reflected in the consumption of corn, a quantifiable substitute for wheat. Internally, nearly
eight million bushels of wheat flowed in from overseas, primarily from Canada. In 1919,
corn farmers produced over 2.8 billion bushels—an all-time high at the time. Like wheat,

40

US Department of Agriculture, Yearbook 1919, (Washington: GPO, 1919), 717.
Alejandro E. Bunge, Revista de Economía de Argentina: Tomo VI, (Enero de 1921), 47.
42
United Kingdom Board of Trade, Annual Statement of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign
Countries and British Possessions: 1919, (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1920),325.

41

76

corn exports fell to a mere 16.73 million from their 1918 highs, but corn imports saw a
fivefold increase.43
American consumers were seeking affordable substitutes and, failing that, forsook
homegrown products for cheaper foreign goods while farm interests ran at cross purposes
with their fellow Americans by demanding tariff protections. This dynamic was obscured
from popular media while the most extreme acts against the costs of living dominated the
headlines: tales of nationwide strikes, race riots, and Bolshevik agitators seeking to take
advantage. Paired with this was the distinct silence projected upon President Wilson.
Throughout 1919 and into 1920, the President—even after suffering from the paralysis of a
near-fatal stroke—held public attention to his fight to get the Senate to ratify the Treaty of
Versailles and consent to the United States joining his new League of Nations while all
else was falling apart. He appeared obsessed with obtaining victory for an idealistic foreign
policy program with his domestic agenda a failure. But, so long as the Versailles Treaty
went unsigned, a state of war existed. So long as the state of war existed, he retained his
emergency economic and police powers through the Food Act and could use them to effect
change. He did this by decreeing the continuation of price controls on essential goods such
as the wheat crop and by rooting out those he deemed responsible for rising prices and
shortages on the shelves. To take on the profiteers, Wilson turned to his Attorney General,
A. Mitchell Palmer to be his tool against inflation while he lobbied to make his powers of
the Food Act permanent.
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Palmer was a Quaker and former congressman from Pennsylvania, whose pacifist
leanings slowly unraveled in the latter years of the Wilson administration. During the war,
Palmer oversaw the confiscation of property owned by German nationals as Wilson’s
Alien Property Custodian. Shortly after his appointment as Attorney General in June 1919,
Palmer and his family were nearly killed when an anarchist bomb exploded outside their
Washington home. The Palmer Raids, that saw agents of the Department of Justice raid
immigrant homes and workplaces and netting thousands of real and imagined Bolshevik
and anarchist plants, also targeted businesses and workmen of all stripes in the food and
fuel industries. Palmer was keenly aware that higher prices and shortages would play into
the hands of Reds at home as they did in Russia. Increased world demand for American
coal and food stuffs was carefully ignored as prices rises and strikes had become the new
normal in post war America. In November 1919, Palmer went before Congress to
strengthen the provisions of the Food and Fuel Act. The New York Times reported that
Palmer called for an increase in fines to $10,000 an offense and up to twenty-years
imprisonment.44 Wilson called for extending the Food Act during his State of the Union
Address in January 1920 and encouraged Congress to make its provisions permanent by
using the government’s authority over interstate commerce. But the Department of Justice
and their allies in statehouses nationwide were not waiting for an extension. Throughout
August 1919, as Palmer lobbied to make the Lever Act permanent, Ohio governor James
Cox issued forty arrest warrants and asked Palmer’s Department of Justice to seize two
million pounds of meat and poultry held in cold storage facilities held by so-called
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profiteers.45Cox’s activities were part of the Department of Justice’s larger suit against
Chicago’s meatpacking giants Swift and Armour & Company that had begun in March.
The proceedings netted 135 corporate and fifty individual defendants who lost their
business interests before a Federal grand jury.46 Once committed, both state and federal
authorities turned their attention from corporate bodies to small businesses. The dragnet
resulted in a handful of prosecutions but escape from jailtime had other consequences.
Only two suspects out of forty-nine cases of alleged hoarding that made it to Federal courts
attention in 1919 resulted in trial, but there were large disclosed seizures in eighteen states:
4.8 million dozens of eggs, 1.7 million pounds of butter, 2.5 million pounds of meat, and
20,000 cases of canned goods. However, the amounts were likely much larger as it was
”the policy of the department, whenever possible, to force hoarded goods into normal
channels of trade.”47 In other words, the product seized were to go onto the market whether
it was through forced donation, like what became of the Mayers’ sugar reserve, or by
compelling the offender to sell at a lower cost in a crude way to drive down prices across
the board by increasing the supply amid shortages.
The loss of dearly gotten inventory meant the potential death of livelihoods and it
was ultimately placed in the hands of those with vested interests. James Cox was keen to
carry on Wilsonian policy to the letter in hopes of grasping the Democratic presidential
nomination in 1920. When the inflationary bubble finally popped in the summer of 1920,
causing prices to fall and cotton to pile uselessly in warehouses, Louisiana governor John
M. Parker promoted the smashing of cotton gins to prevent further production in the hopes
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of driving prices up.48 Parker previously headed Louisiana’s Food Administration during
the war and in the summer of 1919, he called on Palmer to investigate profiteers with the
novel solution of appointing parish committees comprised of grocers, wholesalers, labor
representatives, and private citizens to investigate reports of profiteering. 49 In such an
environment, the crusade against profiteering produced champions of the people among
men like these and gave neighbors and business rivals the capacity to remove their
competition.
Throughout 1920, with the Food Act back in full force, the number of arrests rose
from forty- nine in 1919 to 2,016 in 1920. By year’s end there were 1,641 indictments, 296
of which were brought on over sugar violations. 184 were sentenced.50 The amounts seized
that year were left unspecified, but no amount could hope to drive prices down. The
Department of Justice even went so far as to import commodities from the depressed
Caribbean markets. This includes one mysterious shipment of 14,000 tons of sugar that
arrived in New Orleans in June, only to be claimed by Howard Figg, the special assistant to
the Attorney General’s office.51 These moves helped to bail out Cuban exporters who had
seen falling prices and excess supply, while the department aimed for a similar outcome at
home. Similarly, Hoover’s Grain Corporation continued to purchase wheat at taxpayer
expense to give to the world market. By August 1919, the Corporation had distributed
nearly five million tons of food and nearly $750 million in cash.52
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The altruism of expert managers further penalized the taxpayer and only helped to
undercut the farmer who needed to be rid of his product. Both public and secret shipments
underline conflicting visions of solving an inflationary food shortage, one at home and
another abroad—with a domestic agricultural sector that had become too big to fail and a
global market too big to capture. In 1919, wheat farmers produced 970 million bushels—a
crop never seen before save for the unusual 1915 harvest. Yet even in the absence of
government agents, the crop that made it to market was now fetching upward of $3.45 a
bushel at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. From there, the crop seemed to disappear,
failing to make on store shelves and export. The hike in prices and inability to move
product might very well be chalked up to speculation and foreign competition, especially
in the face of increased production that, in a healthy economy, would keep prices down,
but prices also indicate scarcity. The implication is that less product was making it to
market in the first place. Wilson’s specter of the profiteer is a convenient scapegoat, but the
global implications point to a more systemic problem of inflation and nationalization of the
nation’s railroads.
3.3. Out of Steam: The Cost of Nationalization and the Decline of the Railroad

In March 1919, William McAdoo resigned as Secretary of the Treasury and
Director- General of the Railroad Administration.53 He returned to New York City to cofound McAdoo, Cotton & Franklin, a law firm specializing in financial investments that
would later grow into the prestigious Cahill, Gordon, & Reindel. President Wilson and the
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members of the Federal Reserve Board sent accolades that made McAdoo’s sudden
departure appear as a voluntary abdication from tireless and patriotic wartime work that
was now finished. But perhaps his departure was political. With an eye on the presidency,
McAdoo needed to distance himself from his father-in- law and the large monetary
inflation, record government debts, and a broken railroad system that he left behind. With
McAdoo’s departure, the greatest single obstacle to economic normalcy had been removed
but the damage, particularly to the nation’s railways, had reached the point of no return.
The nationalization of the railroads under the US Railroad Administration gave the same
guarantee of security to both company men and workers in the same manner that price controls
did for the farmer. The railroads before nationalization in December 1917 were plagued with
chronic car shortages and increasing material and personnel costs initiated by inflationary
monetary policies targeted toward other sectors of the economy. The primary task for the
Railroad Administration was to increase tonnage and ensure minimal slowdowns. On the
surface, the mission was a success. For 1918, American railroads had handled over 404 billion
tons of freight, nearly double the 277 billion hauled in the first full year of the war in 1915 with
an addition of only ten thousand more cars to company fleets.54 Likewise, strikes and lockouts
inside the transportation and mining industries fell from their peak in 1917 at 760 to 410 in
1918.55 The trade-offs for heroics of the railroads to carry the United States through the war
came first with an inflexible accounting bureaucracy and high rates to cope with the accelerated
need for improvements and repairs. Those costs were passed onto to their laborers, who
previously negotiated from a position of strength thanks to the Adamson Act and the Clayton
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Act and now saw their bargaining power hemmed in by the Food Control Act that made striking
a jailable offense. It cannot be ascertained whether it was the threat of federal prison or patriotic
zeal of a nation at war that minimized work differences in 1918 and allowed the railroads to
carry a record amount of tonnage, which in turn only exacerbated the problem of rail repair that
in turn penalized workers in all industries resulting in a clamor for higher wages that required
government arbitration to avoid shutdowns.
Inadequate rates, labor squabbles, and the shortage of cars that pestered the railroad
industry before American entry into the Great War magnified almost immediately with
nationalization amid disputes over standard returns stipulated in the Railroad Control Act.
The standard returns were government payments to individual railroad companies whose
amounts were an average of the three previous years before December 29, 1917 when
nationalization was declared. Like net income, the standard return functioned to maintain
corporate organization and equity toward reinvestment. But the distorted amount of traffic
and revenue in 1917 skewed what would ultimately be disbursed. Western railroad outfits
like the Union Pacific, whose returns in 1915 and 1916 were strong, received adequate
compensation packages while Eastern lines flooded the courts with legal challenges to
appeal inadequate returns. Chesapeake and Ohio’s fiscal year 1917 saw a shrinkage of
tonnage and a shortfall in their income over the previous year. That year, the company
brought in $16.5 million in net operating income but a weak fiscal year 1915 and
increasing tax burdens resulted in an initial $13.2 million standard return available to the
company in periodic installments through the year.56
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To stifle these challenges, McAdoo authorized across-the-board interstate increases
in March 1918 and empowered his agents to coordinate with state railroad commissions to
fix intrastate rates. Some like the Illinois Railroad Commission filed suits to stop the
intrusion, but most fell in line for the sake of winning the war. Uniform rates allowed for
uniform cost predictions and minimized issues in transport. Higher rates overall would pad
the expense accounts and bring the US government a sizeable profit—as any profits above
the stated rate of return was forfeited. In theory, these receipts could be reinvested into
company coffers with betterments requests. In reality, betterments were funded through a
Treasury curated sinking fund that bore little resemblance to those excess profits. For
1919, the maintenance of the railroads came at a cost of $359 million—the largest line
item in the federal budget. But even sums like these were not enough and betterments,
particularly those around new military installations, were often done informally and
without immediate reimbursement. In March 1920, the Transportation Act formally
relinquished control of the railroads back to private ownership. Although there were some
calls to keep the railroad under state control, President Wilson insisted on letting them go.
By then, the government had agreed to set up a revolving credit fund to the railroad
industry to refund the damages to a system that was not left as it was found—at the cost of
$1.04 billion for that year alone.57 To undo some of that new debt to the railroads, the
disbanding Railroad Commission and the ICC authorized new rate hikes on goods as high
as an additional thirty-five percent.
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But the rate increases undertaken only served to perpetuate the inflationary cycle in
the worker’s daily lives as those same rate increases were passed onto them with every
product they consumed, resulting in an endless cycle of renegotiation, striking, and price
hikes to compensate. The news media denounced the situation of labor, especially after the
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. For them, labor was corrupted by socialist ideology and
wanted to collapse the nation by pointing out the perceived absurdity of a demanding labor
front whose members earned more than ever. During the war, organized labor oriented
itself in a compact with the federal state for the sake of prosecuting the war. Labor retained
the honored right to organize and negotiate but new laws such as the anti-striking
provisions of the Food Act created a situation in which the federal government was called
in to arbitrate. In 1919 prices continued to rise even as production and the requisite labor
burden increased. To insulate themselves from mediation, labor chose safety in numbers.
Although there were only 3,374 strikes and lockouts that year—far lower than their peak in
1917—the number of participants soared. Small-scale strikes of under one hundred
workers, which had been the bulk of the statistic until 1918, fell in 1919. But those
involved in larger demonstrations markedly increased. In 1918, the number of strikes that
pulled over 1,000 workers off the line were 216. In 1919, that number had grown to 365.58
February ushered in the nation’s first general strike that brought Seattle to a standstill with
a minimum of 60,000 of the city’s workers walking off the job in solidarity with shipyard
workers striking in Tacoma over the cancelation of government contracts that afforded their
pay. From September until the new year, the Great Steel Strike gripped the nation. 365,000
men in fifty cities from the Chicago industrial belt to New York State struck for higher
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wages, an eight- hour day, and the abolition of company unions.59 The strike would
ultimately involve solidarity movements, often stirred by the agitation of the IWW, that
saw two million unionized workers walk off the job. The strike also took an estimated
400,000 miners, particularly those in the coal industry, off the line during the onset of
winter.
While the streets flooded with workers and factories went idle, so did the railroad;
they were now hamstrung for a steady supply of coal and cars remained at congested
terminals, depriving them of their remaining operating capacity. For over a week, New
York City was deprived of fresh produce and corridors of armed Army trucks ran needed
supplies to hospitals. Across the Hudson River in New Jersey, over eight hundred
refrigerated cars sat disconnected, their contents left to rot.60 The backlog of goods had
become so acute that private businesses took novel means to get their supplies. Dayton’s
Dry Goods of Minneapolis, the immediate forerunner of the Target Corporation, broke
ground by initiating some of the first air shipments that year.61 The strikes infected seamen
and engineers who cracked under pressure—many of whom fled to seek better paid work
at inland farms—forcing the government to impose an embargo on all outgoing and
incoming sea traffic.62
In this context of mass shortages of food and fuel, the realities that brought Lenin to
power in Russia, that A. Mitchell Palmer launched his raids to regain control of
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commodities, suppress both real and imagined radicals, and lobby for the strengthening of
the Food Control Act in November. In that moment, President Wilson hesitated. Grappling
with the paralysis of his left side after suffering the first of a series of strokes that would
eventually take his life, Woodrow Wilson began to walk a fine line between the continuity
of control and the realization that his policy prescriptions had gone too far. Wilson’s State
of the Union Address, the first that he did not deliver in person, urged Congress to keep the
Food Control Act and use its interstate commerce powers to regulate more greatly but he
adopted none of the draconian input of his Attorney General. He also gave instructions to
simplify the tax burden and reduce spending immediately.63 As of yet, Wilson did not
know about the raids, but even his addled mind grasped the scale of the problem. Labor
had struck in such numbers so large that the federal state, even within the letter of the law,
was powerless to enforce. Taxation, like the tax of inflation, could be changed to diffuse
the situation. Congress obliged, but the, like the President, were overtaken by events. The
fact of the matter was that the good elements of inflationary monetary spending in the short
term had long been replaced by the onerous cycle of hiking prices to meet wages. Now, in
the winter of the Red Scare, the cycle had grown to affect real production and distribution
despite no shortage of currency.

63

“An Annual Message on the State of the Union: Dec 2, 1919,” Woodrow Wilson Papers, Vol. 64, 107-112.

87

Product Without a Buyer. The Federal Reserve’s First Worldwide Meltdown
When he first arrived in Topeka, Kansas, V.O. Johnson established himself as a
banker when he bought the assets of the floundering Aurine State Bank in June 1913.
Johnson did right by his depositors by issuing credit to the bustling cattle industry outside
of town. He even established his own farm, the Fashionable Stock Place, that would host
hundreds of head of some of the finest cattle in the state. With the success of both of his
ventures, Johnson became one of the foremost experts on fine cattle in a time when
quantity had a quality of its own.
During the war years, cattle were bred, fed, and slaughtered in such numbers, that
new investment in quality beef became more attractive as prices of ordinary cattle
doubled in price.1 In 1920, the wheat crop that dominated Kansas wealth promised to be
the largest on record and the world, facing massive food shortages at the end of the war,
sorely needed it. The same was the case for good American beef. But before the wheat
could be threshed and the fattest cattle could be put onto cars bound for Chicago
slaughterhouses, the bottom fell out. Agricultural prices fell through the summer of 1920
and Topeka’s residents rushed to the bank to find the doors closed. Although Johnson had
established himself during the boom years in the cattle industry, his Fashionable Stock
Place never turned a profit. In fact, Johnson had embezzled $86,000 of his depositors’
money to save his venture--$1.1 million in 2019 dollars. On May 18th, the Kansas City
Star broke the story that the State Attorney General had issued a warrant for Johnson’s
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arrest, while the State Banking Commissioner Walter Wilson, countermanded the order
saying that such an arrest would “hinder the working out of the details into the settlement
of the bank’s affairs.” Wilson, for his part, was covering his own tracks. Between May
26th and July 2nd, the Star reported that V.O. Johnson was given fifteen years in the state
penitentiary and Governor Henry Allen opened an investigation into his banking
commissioner after it became known that the latter had advanced knowledge of the theft
and was remaining silent on other bank failures throughout the state. Despite attesting to
the financial health of the Aurine State Bank and its half-a-million dollars in assets in
May, by July, the bank had gone under, taking V.O. Johnson and Walter Wilson with it.2
Between 1916 and 1919, there were an average of fifty bank failures in the United States.
The Aurine State Bank was one of two hundred in 1920. In 1921, over five hundred more
financial institutions would collapse—taking their credit lines and the remaining savings
that survived years of inflationary growth with them.3
The American economy teetered on the edge in 1920 but the signs of failure had
become apparent. An untold number of Americans to held onto their cash and refrained
from investing. Likewise, in the context of inflationary pricing and crippling strikes, they
sought substitutes and doubled down on the necessities knowing that such goods might not
be available later. The industrious spirit was drying up from the bottom floor and it had
consequential affects for the banks and businesses American consumers did business with.
But inflationary pricing and tax regimes had boxed those concerns into unsustainable
liabilities that could not be repaid with lower prices and lower incomes. Like consumers
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who gambled on getting product before prices could continue to rise, business was forced
to engage in the same strategy. V.O. Johnson was not so dissimilar from this economic
whole whose members shared interchanging and co-mingling roles as capitalists,
entrepreneurs, and workers who were often one-in-the-same. The lack of takers in
Johnson’s cattle and his fall from prominence to criminality in a bid to buy his enterprise
time highlights the next stage of the inflationary cycle—the gamble of a turnaround.
Through the first half of 1920, prices and production continued to soar in the face of all
other metrics of collapse as businesses engaged in mindless action in the hopes that the
symptoms manifested through the previous year would somehow reverse. Instead, there
was luxurious excess and little demand—endless product without a buyer.
The inflationary cycle appeared to end when Benjamin Strong, governor of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, oversaw draconian discount rate increases that
corresponded with a collapse in commodity prices in the summer of 1920. The Federal
Reserve’s role in creating the crisis is undeniable, but the institution also gets the credit for
ending the crisis as well as the blame for the damage inflicted to bring inflation to an end.
Strong’s actions allowed for an easy scapegoat to be found at the time, as well as an
inflection point in hindsight.
Easy credit from the Federal Reserve for political prerogatives is nothing new in
the present. Keeping credit too easy for too long occurred in the leadup to the Great
Depression, the 2008 Great Recession, and the 2020 inflation. Strong’s stand in 1920 thus
placed in stark relief with an indecisiveness of a later era. In truth, there was no better time
nor better Federal Reserve. 1920 was simply a correction of mistakes that would inevitably
be repeated. Worse, assigning too much credit to Strong and the Federal Reserve ascribes
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myths to a singularity with the power to manage countless transactions in finite lives in
which institutional speculation, rather than meaningful value, drive decision making. In
1920, the Federal Reserve’s actions did compel banks to curtail lending and call-in loans,
but the economy was long-symptomatic of collapse and the American people, through their
lack of buying and demand for greater wages against inflation, already initiated the
deflation.
Where blame is duly assigned is by making the deflation more exaggerated.
Milton Friedman came to believe that the Federal Reserve, who had the knowledge of what
was to come, should have acted earlier—despite the political impossibility of doing so.
Others criticize the Federal Reserve’s passiveness after rate increases ceased in 1920. There
would be no wholesale rescue packages and legitimate enterprises died along with bad
business. However, the Federal Reserve did not have oversight power over individual
bank’s lending habits nor could large injections of cash be made, lest it fuel new
expectations and rallying prices. Rather, if the Federal Reserve errored beyond creating
inflation in the first place, it was their monopoly on hard money that would make the
collapse worse and stagnated the recovery. With gold reserves increasingly held by Federal
Reserve and Treasury vaults in the East, banks in the interior were left with scant reserves
to create new loans and guarantee their depositors. Taken together with all the harbingers
of collapse, the lack of adequate reserves killed bona fide business from bad business and
caused a spate of Western bank failures throughout the 1920s that ensured that agriculture
would never recover.
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4.1. A Political Dilemma?
From the end of the Great War in November 1918 until Benjamin Strong’s first rate
increases in November 1919, the Federal Reserve appeared idle in the inflationary spiral. If
the Federal Reserve had the financial power to intervene before the collateral damage of
deflation could be realized, those months represent a missed opportunity. Framed
differently, the Federal Reserve made the deflation more severe by waiting. Milton
Friedman and Anna Schwartz in A Monetary History of the United States laud Strong’s
rate stand but concluded it was belated at the end of 1919 and argued that raising rates
between January and March 1919 during the immediate post-war slump could have been
enough of a brake-pump to extricate the Wilson economy from its inflation. Writing in the
1960s, Friedman projects a more independent Federal Reserve in that time onto a moretimid institution in the past and assumes the Federal Reserve had financial and moral
strength to do so. At the time, pumping the brakes had been tried to no avail and drastic
actions were out of reach during most of this window of opportunity.
The ever-present challenge of the Federal Reserve is to deliver economic stability while
negotiating political guardrails that are often at cross purposes with best practices. The
privilege of dealing and marketing government securities on the open market afforded to
the Federal Reserve from the outset has created a massive portfolio which allows it
nominal independence to pursue its directives. On the other hand, Congressional and
executive actions since the Great Depression increasingly defined the makeup of the Board
of Governors and included policy changes often at contradictory ends—such as controlling
inflation paired with ensuring full employment in the 1970s. In its earliest days, the
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Federal Reserve struggled with the same dilemma. From its creation in 1913, the Federal
Reserve was politically beholden to ideologues in Washington—from the stone of
congressional legislation and the directives of President Wilson channeled financially
through McAdoo’s Treasury Department that embarked on inequitable credit and monetary
inflations and embargos through the war years. Although the Federal Reserve System and
the Treasury appeared to be working in lockstep on these issues, it was an institution on
thin ice with the public. The newness of this central bank had to be tested in the courts with
every bold move and subject to the review of a Congress that had created it and from a
business perspective, the System relied on Congressional coercion to compel national and
state banks into the System and on the Treasury for securities to lend. The Federal Reserve
was made to perpetrate an inflation its directors, themselves raised from the banking class,
knew would lead to distortions.
Inflation had been a concern of the Federal Reserve Board from the start of the
American involvement, with Paul Warburg and WPG Harding pushing for a voluntary war
bond instead of money creation to fund the war effort. The minds of the Federal Reserve
Board toiled to make the Liberty Loan a success under the presumption that it was better
than taxation and continued inflation to achieve the goal of winning the war; but the larger
issue that occupied them at the start was the inevitable pain of transitioning from war to
peace. The Liberty Loan and the various credit rationing schemes of the Federal Reserve
and the War Finance Corporation were meant to soften the blow for when, inevitably, four
years of war demand would end and with it the economy built around it. Although some
industries such as the armaments and textile industries wound down, foreign demand
remained high and domestic production remained tepid. Europe’s devastation had bought
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the American economy time to engage in a transition that the Victory Loan, marketed in
the year of strikes, threatened to undo. But to stand against the Loan meant taking a stand
against the new Treasury Secretary Carter Glass—one of the men most responsible for the
creation of the Federal Reserve in the first place.
A Virginia Democrat, Glass followed the same vein of fiscal progressivism
channeled by McAdoo and Wilson. As chair of the House Committee on Banking, Glass
worked with President Wilson and Oklahoma Senator Robert Latham Owen to craft the
Owens-Glass bill that provided for a central bank that would neither be under complete
private ownership nor under complete government control. That bill would go on to pass
as the Federal Reserve Act. Glass had believed that the best compromise was to create a
banking system that could operate privately but the government could have a controlling
interest through a presidentially appointed board of experts that would become the Federal
Reserve Board. Born of a compromise, the Federal Reserve made no one happy and its
deficiencies were readily apparent with a Board that was too reliant on toxic government
dictates that diluted public faith in the currency and distorted financial decisions in the
private sphere. Now in the spring of 1919, the marketing of the Victory Loan had
produced the first clash on policy.
In the midst of nationwide strikes and a convulsing world economy, the
government had to make the Victory Loan appear to be both safe and appealing. Glass
continued the policy of gold sterilization of his predecessor by instructing his cashiers to
encourage Americans to take Federal Reserve notes in lieu of gold, but when pressed, the
oldest and most worn coins were dispersed. But at Benjamin Strong’s insistence, the gold
clause was extended to this new loan. Congress and the Federal Reserve Board worked the
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legislation authorizing the loan to be tax- exempt to 4.75 % with the right to convert one’s
bond subscription to a government bond with a higher rate of return.4
Despite their best efforts, the Victory Loan underperformed its predecessors but
many Liberty Loan bondholders took the chance to convert their existing bonds to that
higher interest rate, making the overall debt burden—sitting at an all-time high of $26.6
billion in September 1919—increasingly expensive to repay through taxing a public that
was remiss to give up more of its money.5 Further, the Victory Loan represented yet
another redistribution of wealth that did not go to funding war-to-peace transition costs that
rapidly wound down. Once committed to the Treasury, these funds were used to subsidize
world demand through continued credits to Europe and food contracts marked by
government agents at high prices on the farm and sold abroad at a loss—in effect a bailout
for agriculture at the expense of industry that would only encourage ever higher prices and
ever more acute shortages. Although the Federal Reserve was in no position to refuse to
market the Victory Loan, Benjamin Strong began to clammer publicly for raising discount
rates.
Raising the discount rate would also trickle to higher loan interest rates on loans
discouraging easy money. On the other hand, raising the discount rate would make it
harder for the Treasury to pay its debts. While raising rates would make Treasury bonds
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more attractive to new buyers, existing debt would be more expensive to retire. Strong's
opinion was not kept a secret. He first confided his position to Leffingwell, in February
1919, claiming it was the only way to control the “necessary evil” of inflation. He alluded
to the bailout by pointing out that the government had gotten a taste of heavy taxation and
high spending, much of which was funneled into overpaying for perishable goods that
would lead to ever higher prices and increasing shortages. It was now reality. Worse, there
were warning signs of deflation. Strong noted the contraction as early as that letter when he
noted the wool industry had begun to deflate as government contracts dried up and
consumers at home sought cheaper alternatives.6
While inflation is marked by an increase in the supply of money where prices
adjust upward accordingly, deflation is a decrease in money within an economy
accompanied by a fall in prices. Although inflation can occur through supply shocks and
monetary creation, deflation is an entirely monetary phenomenon. In a deflationary
economy, monetary value is either destroyed or otherwise taken off the market by hesitant
investors and consumers. With less credit available and declining sales, businesses cut
prices to entice consumers to buy and, failing that, cut operations. In an inflation,
consumers are made to spend immediately before prices can rise further, generating higher
profits for firms who had the luxury of easy credit.
In a deflation, consumers wait for lower prices to their benefit over now-debtleveraged firms who now have to repay the same dollar amount in debt with declining net
incomes. Those who lost in periods of inflation, gain in deflation, but the political and
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economic damage possible in between the boom and bust cycle is undeniable. The Great
Depression was characterized by a deflation in which up to one-third of the American
money supply disappeared from circulation. Since 1921, the Federal Reserve’s monetary
policy has been characterized by a small year-over-year increase in inflation in the hopes
of spurring continued but controlled economic growth—all in a bit to avoid deflation.
At the end of 1919, Benjamin Strong and his allies on the Federal Reserve Board hoped for
a deliberate but controlled deflation to avoid collateral damage. With the war industries
and the Victory Loan floundering, Glass conceded that rate increases may be needed, but
asked that such talk wait until after the marketing of the Victory Loan. Sensing there was
no time to waste, Strong threatened to raise rates in New York—and by virtue of his
position, effectively raise rates in the entire Federal Reserve system. In response, Glass
questioned the Federal Reserve’s ability to move on its own and called for Strong to be
ousted.7 Congress ultimately ruled in the Federal Reserve’s favor and Strong hiked rates
for the first time in December. Paper backed by government obligations—Treasury bills
and Liberty Bonds— and commercial paper rose from 4.25 to 4.75%. Agriculture and
livestock paper rose from five to 5.5%. 8
Raising rates would force the government to curtail its spending, but business had
long been accustomed to a race against inflation and saw this nominal rise as yet another
cost of staying open. It also emboldened some to borrow big and borrow now, betting
against the incremental increases on the discount rate. Allen Metzler, in A History of the
Federal Reserve, points to a potential speculative bubble in which $1.8 billion was lent by
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Federal Reserve banks between January and May 1920 despite these increasing
restrictions.9
In that window, Benjamin Strong had absconded out of the country—partially to
recoup from his tuberculosis and partially to assess the world economic situation. While
the Europeans, seemingly at a standstill, squibbed over territorial acquisitions and everchanging monetary figures, far-off Japan’s own economy was in a tailspin. Japan had been
an essential check on German possessions in east Asia and were now continuing as a
bulwark against Bolshevik Russia as a supply base for white Russian forces. Japan’s
distance from direct combat and her motivated industrial base had left her in an enviable
position comparable to the United States, but her ambitions backfired when directed
toward another staunch member of the Allied powers, China. Japanese military
intervention and capital investments had been key in the interactions between the two old
Asian powers—with both sides using the Versailles conference table to both lobby for an
end to racial discrimination by the western powers and a degree of legitimacy in this new
order. When the settlement ultimately favored handing the German concessions in China at
Tianjin and Qingdao to the Japanese, widespread protests against the Versailles Treaty
ensued. Student demonstrations by the likes of then unknown actors such as Mao Zedong
and future heirs of the CCP joined popular boycotts of Japanese industrial and textile
goods that flooded the Chinese mainland.
With the world’s largest populace up in arms, Strong observed the decline of
Japanese textile industries, particularly the silk industry that had leveraged itself during the
war. Finished wares sat in docks with nowhere to be delivered while the bills of leveraged
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companies came due, leading to mass unemployment and bankruptcy.10 Contagion was
spreading beyond Europe and the Caribbean export markets. Harsher measures were
needed to stave off a similar fate to the American market. In June, Strong authorized New
York to raise its commercial paper rates to seven percent and encouraged his banks to use
progressive rates to discourage excessive lending. This decision coincided with the
leveling of consumer prices and gives the impression of an inflection point in which a
bubble burst. However, the Board’s 1920 report admitted that lending and rediscounting
levels did not peak until November 5th and member banks could account for a decline of
only $108 million out of that year’s total loans outstanding.11 Businesses needed cash and
they still appeared to be willing to borrow even with nominally higher interest rates tacked
onto their loans even as prices leveled and then crashed in August.
But the banks that facilitated that borrowing were not so unflinching. Strong's
actions to increase the discount rate was meant to make Federal Reserve funds more
expensive and force banks to be more careful about lending too much against their
precious reserves, but Strong’s call for progressive rates reflected an underlying problem
partly of his own making—some of the System’s banks were dangerously low on reserves.
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4.2. The Sins of Sterilization
The Federal Reserves’ years long gold sterilization scheme made their later rate
increases immaterial and turning a credit crunch into a deflationary stranglehold with
banks materially unable and unwilling to lend while consumers cut their own losses. The
Federal Reserve Board was particularly concerned with speculative lending that
increasingly exceeded the capacity to recover from bad debts and satisfy depositor
demands at a time when Americans wanted their cash. After a long-running series of
legislative scratch-offs and accounting chicanery, the entire Federal Reserve System’s
bank reserves, particularly those in the agricultural South and West, were in a precarious
state—a fact underscored by Strong tactfully admitting that discount rate increases were
not sufficient when he recommended that New York impose progressive rates on other
banks.
Progressive rates were a little-known mandate of the Federal Reserve Act and were
authorized as a penalty against member banks to ration credit as a percentage payable to
reserve banks when the member bank’s reserves fell below forty percent of its outstanding
notes. The reserve requirement survived a series of amendments to the Act until 1917.
The 40% gold ratio against Federal Reserve notes found in Section II C was weakened by
Congress to allow banks with 35% ratio of gold and “lawful money” to be retained
instead. The dilution of reserve requirements was coupled by consequences of the years’
long gold sterilization campaign that saw Eastern banks gain gold reserves while Western
concerns were drained. A cursory look at the balance sheets of the twelve Federal Reserve
district banks from 1916 to 1922 nominally shows the opposite.
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Fig 4.1. Gold Movements of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Fig. 4.2. Gold Movements of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
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Fig. 4.1 illustrates the total gold reserves of Strong‘s Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
while Fig. 4.2 represents those of Kansas City, Missouri. New York saw a marked decline in
total reserves from 1918 to 1920, while Kansas City‘s decline was more subdued. But this is
nominal gold assets that could be claimed. Gold held with agents of the Federal Reserve and
earmarked for the Gold Redemption Fund to settle accounts elsewhere nominally count but
were not available in-vault and on demand. Kansas City’s vault gold fell off during the war
years, having been allocated elsewhere. In 1920, vault gold recovered slightly from $191,000 in
1919 to $4.03 million but their overall gold stock fell from $76.2 million to $68.7 million.12
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Fig. 4.3.13 Gold Movements of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, home to the Deep South’s cotton finance,
suffered much the same fate—net gold outflows despite a nominal increase of in-vault gold
in 1920, followed by a cratering as the Depression of 1921 set in. In every case, ratio
between in-vault resources and outsourced allocations at interior banks widened while New
York’s outside liabilities shrank. Even with other lawful money added, the Federal Reserve
Systems reserves were dangerously low at a time where lending continued nearly unabated.
In April 1917, the System’s total cash reserves sat at 84%.14 In December 1919, the
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System’s reserve had fallen to 44.8%. At the end of 1920, the ratio had stabilized at 45.4%.
But in that time frame, Northeastern banks recovered their reserves while Southern and
Western concerns lost.15
The siphoning of gold reserves was mirrored by the Federal Reserve’s discounting
operations. Discounting—not to be confused with discount rates—is the act of marketing
debt securities and bills of exchange at a selling price lower than face or par value in the
hopes of enticing reluctant investors to buy. The investor is then entitled to the par value
and any interest. Rediscounting is the act of discounting an already discounting bill. Unlike
any other typical year, with its cyclical swing of liquidations expected due to agricultural
marketing and replanting, liquidation increased steadily throughout 1920 without pause.
There was no fast sale on Treasury T-Bills and Liberty Bonds that dominated bank
holdings since the war, but faith in productive assets soured. Liquidation of commercial
and agricultural obligations rose steadily from $716 million in January to $1.07 billion in
May.16 Out-of-district and domestic notes flooded the Federal Reserve Banks of Cleveland,
Boston, and Richmond, as they took on the bulk of discounting traffic. But rediscounting
efforts had accelerated in the overleveraged districts in Atlanta, Minneapolis, Kansas City,
and Dallas. In those districts, discounting failed to appeal to consumers, and they now
resorted to slashing their own payout further to offload the debt in exchange for fast cash to
stem the tide. Benjamin Strong’s move to increase the discount rate and establish
progressive rates on spendy banks was meant to prevent superfluous lending and remove
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currency from circulation. Instead, currency flowed outward and lending in general ceased.
Desperate to shore up their reserves to prevent failure, those banks liquidated their loans,
called in those that could not be sold, and demanded additional collateral to ensure
repayment. Money disappeared and businesses resorted to extreme methods to turn around
their fortunes.

4.3. Production and Liquidation

In 1910, an acre of farmland could be had for $39.10. In 1920, that price had
multiplied to an average of $99.24, a rate that more than kept up with the inflation of the
war. And more coveted land was fetching far higher prices. One famed prediction came
from C. E. Cameron, the Chairman of the Iowa Department of Agriculture who reminded
guests at the state’s agriculture conference that he had previously predicted correctly that
land would sell for $300-500 an acre and when “people ask me if I think this land will stay
at that price and I say it certainly will. It may not go any higher for some time, but I do not
think it will go back.”17 Predictions like these underscored the fact that, with this rate of
appreciation, the farmer was, at best, hedging himself against inflation. The price of his
farm went up, serving as tempting collateral for a cycle of debt to fund ever rising costs in
land, labor, and equipment. Faced with loan calls by commercial banks, agricultural
interests turned to the War Finance Corporation and the Farm Loan Board for easier credit
terms. The War Finance Corporation alone lent out $48.7 million, the highest at that point
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in its existence, in the first three months of 1920 before President Wilson suspended their
operations.18
As credit dried up and prices declined, business turned to a mix of speculation,
production, lobbying, and legitimized hoarding. Some turned to luxuries with a niche
appeal and the potential for a massive payoff. During the war years, V.O. Johnson gambled
on the nurturing of prime beef in an inflationary market of cheaper alternatives that might
entice only the highest buyers but was priced out of reach of most Americans; others opted
for maximum production of existing goods to offset falling prices with higher overall sales.
In response to hiked wages in the aftermath of the Great Steel Strike, US Steel’s ingot
production rose from 17.20 tons in 1919 to a peak of 19.28 million, a gross increase of
twelve percent. The firm’s ore mining operations increased another 6.2% over the previous
year, but it came at the cost of hiring an additional twelve thousand workers and raising
wages from $6.12 to $6.96 per day—a rate that outpaced both mining and production
operations.19 Accelerated operations created high--or inflated-- profits of $1.22 billion, but
it came at the costs of higher expenses and accelerated wear that jeopardized sustainability.
US Steel’s depreciation, debt interest, and expense accounts rose sixteen percent from
$180 million in 1919 to $209 million.20 The net result was a glut of steel on the market
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without a demand for it at high prices that had to be passed on to the consumer.21
Compensatory production tendencies also mirrored onto agriculture. Cotton production,
which had been relatively stable, peaked near its 1914 highs in 1920 with over 13.4 million
bales put onto the market to fetch an August harvest price of $16.55 per bale. That same
time the previous year, the going rate was $38.21. Likewise, corn production reached an
all-time high of 3.2 billion bushels even as the Chicago trade prices fell from their high of
$2.71 a bushel in autumn 1919 to a low of $0.59 in 1920. The large crop of 1921 was
trading for as low as $0.46. As prices were cut, domestic buyers still refused to buy in the
belief that prices would continue to fall, farmers turned desperately to international
markets.
Corn farmers were among the lucky who were able to grow their exports as foreign
buyers refused wheat. In almost every aspect, American productive capacity had been
overused and consumers less willing to consume. Farm interests, particularly those in the
wheat industry, collectively howled for a bailout, but the out-going President Wilson
refused to intervene. Over his veto, Congress reanimated the War Finance Corporation and
the Federal Farm Loan Board in January 1921.22 By then, Wilson and the Democratic
Party had been swept from power after the election of 1920 that saw Warren Harding
crush the profiteer-hunter Ohio governor James Cox on a platform of “a return to
normalcy” that included deflation, deficit reduction, and tax cuts. Harding stayed true to
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these pledges even as the economy continued to free fall as commodity prices fell fifty-six
percent from their mid-1920 levels by the end of 1921. In an era before compulsory
unemployment benefits, it was estimated that as many as one in five Americans were
thrown out of work, mostly in the inflated industries while the service industries that had
suffered during the war recovered.23 Price deflation had come on so rapidly that it
outpaced wage cuts and real purchasing power of the employed, for the first time in seven
years, rose.
Table 4.1.24 Money Stock in Relation to Buying Power 1913-1922

1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922

Money Stock
(000)
$3,363,738
$3,402,015
$3,169,220
$4,024,097
$4,763,576
$5,379,427
$5,766,030
$6,087,555
$5,776,437
$5,666,092

Money Stock in Relation to Buying Power
1913-1922
%
Agriculture
%
Change
Wages
Change
$30.31
1.1
$29.88
-1.4
-6.8
$30.15
0.9
27
$32.83
8.8
18.4
$40.43
23.1
12.9
$48.80
20.7
7.2
$56.29
15.3
5.6
$64.95
15.3
-5.1
$43.32
-33.3
-2.0
$41.79
-3.5

%
Flour Change
3.1
3.5
12.9
4.1
17.1
4.4
7.3
7.6
72.7
6.8
-10.5
7.4
8.8
8.4
13.5
5.7
-32.1
5.1
-10.5

Table 4.1 shows the supply of money outside the Treasury in circulation at the end of every
fiscal year between 1913 and 1922 paired with average monthly agricultural wages as
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supplied by Department of Agriculture. As a reference of wages to buying power, the
average August price for one pound of flour supplied by estimates from the Department of
Labor is used. This simple example shows the general tendency of wages to act
inelastically in comparison to rising consumer prices. American involvement in the Great
War beginning in 1917 brought price spikes contributable to an increased velocity of
money as the modest increase in money stock was spent at higher rates on fewer available
goods on the free market. In 1919, prices began to decline only to rally once again through
1920. Between June 1920 and June 1922, the money stock fell 7.1%. Wages fell, but
product prices fell faster turning ostensive wage cuts into buying power increases.
The new President, Warren Harding, did not endorse bailout schemes nor take the
advice of Herbert Hoover. As the incoming Secretary of Commerce, Hoover looked at the
growing droves of unemployed with alarm and advocated the creation of a public works
program to create jobs—a suggestion preceding the New Deal by over a decade. Harding
was more interested in empowering his Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon to lower
American tax burdens and bring federal spending under control. But the politically and
materially vital agricultural sector proved to be too essential to merit invisible action.
Harding did expand the Farm Loan Board’s finances and signed the Agriculture Credits
Act in August 1921 that expanded the War Finance Corporation’s loan operations to
include dealer and warehouse financing. Taken together with ordinary and export loans,
disbursements from the War Corporation ballooned in 1921 with $61.6 million in credit
followed by another $240.8 million in 1922.25
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Fig 4.4. 26 Disbursements of the Federal Farm Loan Board 1918 to 1923

This relief was not immediate nor large enough to save farmers who had to liquidate
crops nurtured at inflated prices at far lower prices than they had paid for them.
The final defiant act of business was to hold goods off the market to keep prices high.
Eugene Meyer, chairman of the War Finance Corporation, reflected with alarm at the
livestock situation. Ranchers that reared a record number of cattle and pigs in 1920
scrambled to send juvenile animals to the Chicago slaughterhouses before prices could fall
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further. Now in 1921, without young stock to replace the old, entire breeding herds were
decimated. The Corporation had success floating a one million bale loan for cotton export
out of the South, like what the Federal Reserve did in 1914. It did little to keep prices
stable. Through 1921, regional refiners saw their cotton gins smashed and at least 25,000
destroyed by saboteurs.27 The Macon Daily Telegraph reported one nighttime blaze in
January 1921 near Spartanburg, South Carolina that destroyed five warehouses and over
fifty tons of cottonseed and an equal amount of precious fertilizer.28 The exact cause of the
blaze is unknown but mysterious nighttime fires destroyed gin plants and warehouses
throughout the year. Even when cotton was not destroyed, precious resources for the
growth and storage of future crops were.
These crude attempts to limit supply were paired with more systemic and political
approaches. Louisiana governor John Parker, once a fierce enforcer of the Food Control
Act, asked ginners in his state to refuse to work in order to hold out for a living price,
though waiting would ruin them.29 The danger of deflation accelerated the growth of
farmer cooperative firms amongst the strongest players, financed in part by Federal Land
Bank and War Finance Corporation subsidies. The most influential of these coopts, the
National Wheat Growers Association, attempt to hold its collective 250 million bushels off
the market to increase prices in 1921 and 1922. While trying to corner the market, the farm
lobby insisted on new tariffs to protect them from foreign competition, but to no avail.30
Even as more Americans flocked to the city, these modern agribusiness concerns that had
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been fostered by regulatory policies of the federal state used inflationary and deflationary
monetary policies to solidify their grip on the country by pushing out yeomen farmers. At
the height of their potential in 1920, more farms were mortgaged out than there had been
in the last twenty years. The 1920 Census shows a gloomy trend of centralization around
agribusiness already underway. Between 1910 and 1920, mom and pop farms under twenty
acres decreased from 839,166 to 796,535. Likewise, farms sized between 50-500 acres fell
from 3,932,530 to 3,630,852. But farms greater than 500 acres in size grew; farms larger
than 1000 acres likewise grew from 50,125 to 67,405.31 The deflation of 1921 would
strengthen agribusiness and forced the family farm, then still the bulk of food productive
capacity, into dire straits just as the Roaring Twenties were underway.
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Conclusion
Economic downturns yield useful lessons on political economy and on the everyday
lives of millions who participate in an inherently social engagement of buying and selling.
The Great Depression defined a generation. The Panic of 1837 undid the presidency of
Martin Van Buren before it could even begin. The Panic of 1873 served as the great
catalyst for union labor organization.
The 1921 Depression is completely forgotten, yet it was the most severe
contraction until the Great Depression. The strikes and fall in investment that befell the
American economy in 1919 was mirrored globally. Nominal unemployment rose to an
unheard- of nineteen percent. Union unemployment was particularly high, with some states
such as Massachusetts. noting as many as one in three union workers out of work.1 The
flight of cash off the market—the monetary deflation—was small, with a 7.1% contraction
between 1920 and 1922.2 But wholesale prices fell over fifty-six percent—a contraction
more severe than any other thus far. The better-known downturns serves as easy anecdotes
on the past madness of markets in a boom-and-bust cycle that invite present attempts at
regulation and political debate to make a case that events do not represent. 1921 forces us
to confront the methods of that madness in the form of institutional control and financial
equity that seldom make economic sense. The 1921 Depression was the first test in
American central banking, its economic damage undoing the promise of the Wilson
administration and creating an agricultural class that could no longer operate without state

1

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Annual Report of the Statistics of Labor for the Year Ending Nov.
30, 1921, (Boston: Department of Labor and Industries, 1922), 33.
2
Fig. 4.1.

subsidies just as the United States rose to its peak on the global stage. Eight years before
the rise of the regulatory state in response to the Great Depression, 1921 set the stage for
the New Deal while the events that transpired make the case the regulatory control does
more harm. The coincidental timing of the deflation to the credit of the Federal Reserve
ensured those lessons would not be learned. Instead the fear of deflation, and efforts to
control it, have dominated business and policymaking ever since. Keynesian-style
monetary policies of consumer stimulus during periods of contraction coupled with higher
taxation during the upswing also has the tendency of mitigating the worst aspects of a
deflation but trading it for slow growth and inflation—such as during the prolonged Great
Depression and the Great Recession. The 1921 Depression lacked the relief of a latter age
and the economy had staged a recovery before 1923—a depression that seemed to cure
itself and concluded so quickly few have heard of it.
In truth, reality is missed when memory is substituted for context and tangible
lessons are replaced by minutia. Far from being free of political intervention, the
Depression of 1921 was, in fact, the result of politicized national institutions creating
national problems, trading acute and localized economic atrophy for misery that transcends
class, regional, national, and even international boundaries in a pattern of policy and
circumstances that would repeat. The road to 1921 was engineered by the Federal Reserve
at the behest of the executive branch with an intentional monetary inflation directed out of
the best possible intentions—to uplift marginalized agriculture and create an economic
growth that would be beneficial to all. Both farm credit and a nationalized bank system
enjoyed progressive support and a popular appeal, but their implementation together
created a monetary approach that was a zero-sum game. The early years of legislative wins
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and inflation were a boon to agriculture, who accumulated buying power at the expense of
other sectors.
Inflation became more noticeable during the slow creep of nationalization that
spread from the Federal Reserve to the monopolization of commodities and transportation
infrastructure under government control through entities like the Food and Fuel
Administrations and the Railroad Administration. This takeover was justified by American
involvement in the Great War, but like a central bank and farm credit, it was part of a
political platform that favored crop subsidies and equitable freight rates. However, the
takeover brought government agents—those closest to the cash— directly into competition
with her own citizens to buy at their expense with no option for refusal. Price ceilings on
goods added to the distortions, creating surpluses of unwanted commodities at high prices.
Increased supplies paired with rate controls increased tonnage and traffic on American
railways in the short term, but resulted in both infrastructure and labor burnout in the long
run as rail companies lacked the funds and the availability of equipment to keep the
country supplied.
The Wilson administration had empowered agriculture to consolidate, banks to
lend, and labor to organize for higher wages. This created a cycle in which agriculture was
forced to continue expanding, banks to continue overleveraging, and labor forced to agitate
and glance toward Bolshevik solutions in order to come out head. Faced with social and
economic collapse, the executive found a scapegoat in the nation’s businessmen. John
Maynard Keynes in The Economic Consequences of the Peace, called these so-called
profiteers the true active component of a capitalist economy and they “are a consequence
and not a cause of rising prices. They are timid and reduced to easy victims of
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intimidation.” Keynes was commenting on the then- ongoing debauchment of the ruble by
the Bolsheviks, who used the resulting higher prices to support a campaign against the
kulaks that produced most of Russia’s food.3 The Wilson administration did not resort to
murder to target its new enemies, but public mythmaking in print and the threat of arrest
and imprisonment by the Justice Department in a crude attempt to lower prices—never
mind it could result in bankruptcy and the total removal of goods from the economy. The
consumer and laborer joined them in their dire straits.
While the Wilson administration targeted innocent individuals for an inflation that
could only be caused by institutional monopoly on the state of the finances, their faith in a
face-saving deflation lay on that same institution—the Federal Reserve. The Federal
Reserve’s hiking of interest rates in spring of 1920 appeared to quash inflation, but this is
illusionary. Since the Armistice, the good effects of inflation—the incentives for
consumers to buy and businesses to expand—had begun to turn rotten. Consumers that had
rallied to fund the war through the Liberty Loan and other savings instruments withdrew
their cash from the market and spent on the bare necessities, leading to lagging
subscriptions for the 1919 Victory Loan, a decline in demand deposits in banks nationwide,
and an increased taste in substitutes and foreign alternatives to basic staples. Wages and
supply of product likewise suffered. The famed Weimar hyperinflation that gripped
Germany from 1921-24 saw prices changes so rapid worker absenteeism affected
production.4In other words, workers spent their rapidly depreciating currency rather than
remain at their posts. The United States in 1919 was gripped by strikes that paralyzed the
3

John Maynard Keynes C.B., The Economic Consequences of the Peace, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920),
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Lewis E. Hill, Charles E. Butler, and Stephen A. Lorenzen, “Inflation and the Destruction of Democracy: The
Case of the Weimar Republic,” Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 11 No. 2, (June 1977), 302.
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transportation of seemingly endless product, transforming a steady decline in living
standards into a revolutionary tinder of shortages and a flight of cash that made further
inflation impossible.
The Federal Reserve’s rate approaches in 1920 prevented a false rally of prices but
consumer confidence had already begun the deflation for them. But the coincidental timing
would only create misplaced confidence in the Federal Reserve. The System’s gold
sterilization scheme removed gold from common circulation and from rural bank vaults
created the K-shaped economic recovery that all commentators, even the Federal Reserve
itself, wished to avoid. Scott Nations in The History of the United States in Five Crashes
theorized that Benjamin Strong’s draconian rate increases nearly throttled the economy and
for the rest of the 1920s, the System was timid to act on increasing speculation in the New
York Stock Exchange.
Alternatively, they may have been fooled into believing their powers were greater
than what they were. The Federal Reserve arrived at the conclusion that their rate increases
popped the bubble—or perhaps they used rate policy as cover for graver mismanagement.
In any event, the Federal Reserve’s inactivity from 1921-1928 could have been a period of
lethargy in the belief that hard rate increases would—they believed—head off another
crisis. But inflation had been created once again in that period, with Federal Reserve rates
held low. In 1929, Benjamin Strong had succumbed to his battle with tuberculosis and the
Federal Reserve he left behind drove interest rates higher, but were unable to pop a Wall
Street bubble that now thrived on cheaper corporate cash.
In the years since the Great Depression, the Federal Reserve has nominally adopted
inflationary manipulation out of fear of another calamity to the benefit of some over others.
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Thus the Federal Reserve, born to create economic equity and monetary stability, has
continuously failed. Worse, their undeserved reputation as economic problem-solvers
contributes to irrationality in the market among those true drivers of economic growth and
decline—the American public. In 1919, they had little regard for the Federal Reserve and
its attempts at moral suasion to achieve a soft landing on inflation without subsequent
bankruptcy and job losses. Indeed, some like farm interests, had ushered in the cycle in the
first place. In the years since, the want for a greater money supply to solve real and
perceived ills continues to enjoy political support, but the critical mass of innovation and
capital has since become timid. Ordinary entrepreneurs, consumers, and investors have
learned to disregard their own instincts and rely on Federal Reserve Board announcements
to finance in some markets, liquidate in others, while creating new ones. In judging profit,
value, utility, and sustainability, the collective wisdom of millions is sacrificed to the
whims of imperfect elite control with a storied history of failure.
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